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COMMENTS
THE NBA SALARY CAP:
CONTROLLING LABOR COSTS
THROUGH COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
The economic viability of the National Basketball Association (NBA)
is dependent upon maintaining fan interest, which, in turn, creates reve-
nue through attendance at games and by selling broadcast rights to televi-
sion networks and cable stations.1 In 1983, the NBA and the National
Basketball Players Association (NBPA) agreed to limit the aggregate
amount each team in the league may spend annually on player salaries.'
1. Jeffrey E. Levine, Note, The Legality and Efficacy of the National Basketball Asso-
ciation Salary Cap, 11 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 71, 71-72 (1992) (explaining that com-
petitive balance among the league's teams is necessary to generate revenues). Parity
among league teams enhances the probability of economic success in professional sports
leagues because the competition has the effect of increasing fan support. JOHN C. WEIS-
TART & CYM H. LOWELL, THE LAW OF SPORTS § 5.07, at 595 (1979).
2. In re National Basketball Ass'n, 630 F. Supp. 136, 137 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) [hereinafter
In re New York Knickerbockers Basketball Club]; see also Levine, supra note 1, at 71-72
(discussing the history of the NBA and NBPA agreement limiting players' salaries and the
continuing need for such a provision); Jon P. Newton, Note, Suggestions for the New Col-
lective-Bargaining Agreement in Professional Basketball: The Legacy of the Albert King
Case, 19 CONN. L. REV. 1001, 1006-08 (1987) (defining the salary cap, explaining the bene-
fits received by each side, and noting exceptions to the cap). But cf Scott J. Foraker, Note,
The National Basketball Association Salary Cap: An Antitrust Violation?, 59 S. CAL. L.
REV. 157, 157-58 (1985) (arguing that the salary cap violates antitrust laws).
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The parties created the salary cap3 in response to the declining revenues
of some teams and to enhance the competitive balance among teams.4
Recognizing the need for economic stability, the players agreed to the
salary cap despite its negative effects on salaries, player movement, and
free agency.5 The NBA negotiated the terms of the salary cap with the
NBPA, acting as the bargaining agent for the players, and the parties sub-
sequently added the salary cap provision to the 1980 collective bargaining
agreement.6 However, the collective bargaining agreement negotiated
between the NBA and the NBPA expired at the conclusion of the 1993-94
3. Collective Bargaining Agreement between the National Basketball Association
and the National Basketball Players Association art. VII (Nov. 1, 1988) [hereinafter
Agreement]. The aggregate salary of each team must comply with the salary cap, as com-
puted by Article VII. Id. at pt. D, at 68. This computation establishes the maximum team
salary as being 53% of the Defined Gross Revenues (DGR) of the league, less expenses,
plus or minus any adjustments to projected television revenues and DGR. Id. DGR is
broadly defined to include all revenue sources, known or unknown, that result from player
performance in NBA games. Id. at art. VII, pt. A, sec. 1(a)(1), at 55. Specific activities
excluded from DGR include All-Star games, parking, sale of concessions, and the sale of
novelty items. Id. Furthermore, revenues generated by NBA Properties, Inc., a subsidiary
of the NBA that markets and sells sponsorships and licensed products, are specifically ex-
cluded from the calculation of DGR. Id. at 55-56. As the popularity of the NBA grows,
the revenue generated by NBA Properties, Inc. increases. For instance, marketers esti-
mated the 1992 sales of NBA-licensed merchandise at $1.8 billion, an anticipated growth of
28% from 1991. Gary Levin, NBA is Real Pro in Scoring Sponsorships, ADVERTISING
AGE, Nov. 9, 1992, at 3, 41.
The creation of the minimum and maximum aggregate salary amounts effectively creates
a partnership between the league and the players. See Foraker, supra note 2, at 163. As
the total DGR of the league increases, so will the aggregate team salaries. Id.
4. Sam Goldaper, Salary Cap Helps Reshape N.B.A., N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 1984, at
A25, A30. According to NBA Commissioner David Stern:
"The cap was designed to assure the financial stability of all our teams and jobs
for the 276 players on those teams," he said. "It is also supposed to foster com-
petitive balance and, over all, to generate more revenues. It has brought in new
ownerships to strengthen the weaker teams and we expect that the majority of
our teams will make money this season. Most important, it keeps the teams in the
smaller markets from simply becoming farm teams for the larger teams, who have
an enormous amount of money to spend on players."
Id.
In the early 1980s, the poor financial performance of the league's teams reflected the
need for change for many teams to remain solvent. E.M. Swift, From Corned Beef to
Caviar, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, June 3, 1991, at 74, 79-80. During the 1980-81 season, 16 of
the league's 23 teams lost money. Id. Total attendance declined by over 1 million fans
from the prior season. Id. On average, teams were selling only 58% of their seating capac-
ity for games. Id. Without the implementation of the salary cap, as many as seven teams
may have been forced to cease operating. Id. at 73.
5. Goldaper, supra note 4, at A30.
6. Bridgeman v. NBA, 675 F. Supp. 960, 962-63 (D.N.J. 1987); see Foraker, supra
note 2, at 157; Levine, supra note 1', at 71.
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season.7 Therefore, it is uncertain if the salary cap, or other labor provi-
sions, will be included in future agreements.8
Labor issues in the NBA have been the subject of collective bargaining
since the judicial determination of Robertson v. NBA. 9 In Robertson,
NBA players filed a class action suit alleging that various NBA labor
practices violated antitrust laws."° The United States District Court for
the Southern District of New York indicated that the labor provisions
probably would fail an antitrust challenge." The district court, however,
encouraged the parties to settle the dispute through collective bargaining,
thereby qualifying the agreement between the NBA and the NBPA for a
nonstatutory labor exemption from antitrust laws. 12
The traditional approach for evaluating labor disputes in other indus-
tries is to balance the goals of labor policy and antitrust laws.' 3 Antitrust
laws seek to promote competition within a given industry, while labor
laws seek to encourage resolution of disputes between labor and manage-
ment through collective bargaining.14 When labor provisions result from
collective bargaining, courts may shield the provisions from antitrust
scrutiny by granting a nonstatutory labor exemption."5 Professional
sports leagues present a unique problem for courts evaluating labor dis-
putes because teams within a league are not economic competitors. 16 In-
stead, the teams are dependent upon the financial success of the other
7. See NBA v. Williams, 857 F. Supp. 1069, 1072 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
8. See id.
9. 389 F. Supp. 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
10. Id. at 872-73.
11. Id. at 895.
12. Id.. For a discussion of nonstatutory labor exemptions, see infra part I.B.
13. D. Albert Daspin, Note, Of Hoops, Labor Dupes and Antitrust Ally-Oops: Fouling
Out the Salary Cap, 62 IND. L.J. 95, 95 (1986) (stating that the goal of labor legislation is to
encourage collective bargaining, while the goal of antitrust legislation is to promote
competition).
14. Id.
15. See id. at 95-96.
16. See United States v. National Football League, 116 F. Supp. 319, 323 (E.D. Pa.
1953). One issue addressed was whether professional teams compete economically, be-
cause teams within a league are financially interdependent. Id. This economic interdepen-
dence differentiates professional sports from other industries in which companies generally
seek an economic advantage over each other. Id.; see Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum
Comm'n v. National Football League, 726 F.2d 1381, 1391 (9th Cir.) (holding that National
Football League (NFL) teams are not competitors and, therefore, the Sherman Act protec-
tions do not apply), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 990 (1984); Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d
1173, 1178-79 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (stating that NFL teams are not economic competitors).
But see Chicago Professional Sports Ltd. Partnership v. NBA, 961 F.2d 667, 672 (7th Cir.)
(suggesting that the NBA is a joint venture only in the production of its games, but is
analogous to a cartel in the sale of its television rights, thus requiring an antitrust exemp-
tion for the owners to act cooperatively), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 409 (1992).
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teams for economic viability.17 Therefore, the economic interdependence
between teams in professional sports necessitates the use of joint labor
provisions among teams, which may encompass unacceptable restraints
on trade in another industry.1 8
Judicial resolution of labor disputes within professional sports leagues
favors granting a nonstatutory labor exemption to antitrust laws if there is
evidence of collective bargaining. 9 The United States Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit set forth a three-pronged test in Mackey v. National
Football League,2" which serves as the standard for evaluating antitrust
challenges in professional sports.2 No guideline as clear as Mackey,
however, exists for challenges to labor provisions under labor law princi-
ples rather than under antitrust laws. 2
Courts have interpreted certain provisions within the collective bar-
gaining agreement negotiated between the NBPA and the NBA.23 Be-
17. See National Football League, 116 F. Supp. at 323 (stating that if professional
teams in a league compete economically with each other, then the stronger teams will
bankrupt the weaker teams, which will cause the entire league to fail).
18. WEISTART & LOWELL, supra note 1, at 595 (recognizing that professional sports
leagues assert that collective action, which may not survive antitrust scrutiny if adopted by
a different type of industry, is essential to their existence and that restraining players'
movement between teams is reasonable to maintain the league as a viable entity); see also
Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n, 726 F.2d at 1391 (holding that NFL teams are
not competitors and, therefore, the Sherman Act protections do not apply); Smith, 593
F.2d at 1178-79 (stating that NFL teams are not economic competitors). Commentators
have stated that courts have failed to establish acceptable analytic parameters for the rea-
sonableness of agreements within professional sports as they relate to section 1 of the Sher-
man Act. Paul J. Tagliabue, Antitrust Developments in Sports and Entertainment, 56
ANTITRUST L.J. 341, 348 (1987). The result has been an encroachment into managerial
discretion caused by insufficient guidelines for judicial review of agreements in profes-
sional sports. Id.
19. Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 612 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. dis-
missed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977); Robertson v. NBA, 389 F. Supp. 867, 895 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
When courts recognize the league as a joint venture, they have applied the "Rule of Rea-
son" to evaluate potential antitrust implications of labor policy or other league action.
Chicago Professional Sports Ltd., 961 F.2d at 673. The rule of reason analysis seeks to
determine the effect of the challenged activity on the entire market in question. Id.
20. 543 F.2d at 614. The Eighth Circuit found collective bargaining to be exempt from
antitrust law if: (1) the restraint of trade primarily affects only those parties participating in
the collective bargaining; (2) the agreement concerns a mandatory subject of collective
bargaining; and (3) the agreement is the product of bona fide arms-length bargaining. Id.
21. Id. at 623.
22. See Tagliabue, supra note 18, at 359; see also NBA v. Williams, 857 F. Supp. 1069,
1074-76 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (stating that courts have taken four approaches to determine
whether labor provisions are enforceable and continue after a collective bargaining agree-
ment between a professional sports league and a players' union expires).
23. See Robertson, 389 F. Supp. at 895 (holding that various player restraints violated
antitrust laws); see also Bridgeman v. NBA, 675 F. Supp. 960, 967 (D.N.J. 1987) (holding
that the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement do not cease immediately upon
the expiration of the document); In re New York Knickerbockers Basketball Club, 630 F.
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cause parties negotiated the labor provisions through collective
bargaining, courts generally have supported the express terms of the con-
tract and have protected the implied intent of the provisions.24 Recently,
the NBA invalidated a contract signed by a free agent player, Chris Dud-
ley, because the league claimed the contract circumvented the salary cap
provision and thus violated the collective bargaining agreement.25
The league challenged a clause in Dudley's contract that allowed Dud-
ley to terminate the contract after one year.26 In effect, this unilateral
termination right exploited a clause within the collective bargaining
agreement that allows teams to exceed the salary cap when re-signing
their own free agents.27 Dudley can exercise his option to terminate the
contract and sign a new contract with the same team without being con-
strained by the salary cap.28 The league sued Dudley in the United States
District Court for the District of New Jersey after a Special Master up-
held the one-year out provision in the contract.29 The district court
agreed with the NBA's contention that the one-year out provision signifi-
cantly affected the salary cap's effectiveness in regulating player move-
Supp. 136, 139 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (holding that the use of outsized bonus payments in the
signing of a free agent player was an impermissible circumvention of the salary cap); Wood
v. NBA, 602 F. Supp. 525, 529-30 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (holding that rookie players are bound
by the terms of the collective bargaining agreement between the NBA and the NBPA),
aff'd, 809 F.2d 954 (2d Cir. 1987).
24. Robertson, 389 F. Supp. at 872-73; see also Bridgeman, 675 F. Supp. at 961; New
York Knickerbockers Basketball Club, 630 F. Supp. at 137; Wood, 602 F. Supp. at 526.
25. In re Dudley, 838 F. Supp. 172, 174 (D.N.J. 1993).
26. Id. Dudley's former team, the New Jersey Nets, offered a contract that included
six years of guaranteed salary and an option year. Id. at 174-75. The salary would have
paid him: $1,560,000 in 1993-94; $2,028,000 in 1994-95; $2,496,000 in 1995-96; $2,964,000 in
1996-97; $3,432,000 in 1997-98; $3,900,000 in 1998-99; and $4,368,000 in 1999-2000. Id. at
175. Instead, he accepted a contract from the Portland Trail Blazers at the following salary
amounts: $790,00 in 1993-94; $1,027,000 in 1994-95; $1,264,000 in 1995-96; $1,501,000 in
1996-97; $1,738,000 in 1997-98; $1,975,000 in 1998-99; and $2,212,000 in 1999-2000. Id.
Though the Trail Blazers' offer was significantly less, it included a one-year out provision,
which would allow Dudley to become a free agent after the first year of his contract. Id.
27. Agreement, supra note 3, art. VII, pt. F, sec. l(d), at 75.
28. Dudley, 838 F. Supp. at 182 (stating that the Special Master did not consider suffi-
ciently the potential that one-year out provisions may have in weakening the salary cap).
In the summer of 1994, Dudley exercised the one-year out provision in his contract and
signed a new, six-year contract worth $24 million with the Trail Blazers. Robert McG.
Thomas, Jr., Grant in Legal Limbo After Contract Ruling, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1994, at
B19.
29. Dudley, 838 F. Supp. at 173-74. In accordance with dispute resolution involving
the terms of a collective bargaining agreement, the NBA submitted its grievance to Special
Master Merrell E. Clark, Jr. Id. at 173. The Special Master ruled that the one-year out
provision did not violate any express term of the collective bargaining agreement. Id. at
173-74.
1994]
Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 44:205
ment and controlling salary costs. 30 The court, however, applied a clearly
erroneous standard to the Special Master's ruling and upheld the con-
tract.3' The district court's acceptance of the Special Master's ruling is
indicative of a general inclination to interpret the terms of the collective
bargaining agreement narrowly.32
This Comment reviews leading antitrust cases and the analytic frame-
work used to grant certain labor practices a nonstatutory exemption from
antitrust laws. Next, this Comment examines the practice of determining
labor policy within the NBA through collective bargaining. Then, this
Comment reviews litigation between the NBA and its member teams and
players to weigh the judicial response to challenged labor provisions.
This analysis focuses specifically on the salary cap. Finally, this Comment
concludes that the salary cap can survive as a viable labor restraint only if
its terms are amended in the next round of collective bargaining.
I. STATUTORY AND NONSTATUTORY LABOR EXEMPTIONS TO
ANTITRUST LAWS
The Sherman Act 3 3 is the primary legislative weapon against antitrust
activities in the United States.34 Section 1 of the Sherman Act states that
every contract or business combination in constraint of trade is illegal.35
On its face, the Sherman Act contains no specific language exempting the
30. Id. at 182. Judge Debevoise stated, "If such an option is permissible, there is the
potential that Dudley, if he and the teams are willing to wait a year, can negotiate with
many or all the teams for a salary in excess of their salary caps." Id.
31. Id. at 180 (stating that inaccurate findings of fact, inappropriate use of the law, or
an abuse of discretion will constitute finding the holding of the special master clearly
erroneous).
32. Id. The Special Master acknowledged that the one-year out provision of the col-
lective bargaining agreement has a value to the players, but did not recognize this value as
included in the player's salaries. Id. at 179. The Special Master consulted the definition of
"'salary'" given by the collective bargaining agreement, which includes anything of
"'value.' " Id. The Special Master then proceeded to delineate his own definition of sal-
ary, which limited the definition of value to money, property, and investments. Id. at 180.
Hence, the Special Master narrowly constructed how the one-year out provision in a multi-
year contract is to be viewed. Id. at 179-80.
33. Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988).
34. See WEISTART & LOWELL, supra note 1, at 527-28 (suggesting that the plain lan-
guage and the legislative intent of the Sherman Act indicate that it was meant to apply to
business transactions).
35. Sherman Act, ch. 647, § 1, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ 1 (1988)). The provision requires proof that the challenged action is concerted between
two or more parties. See WILLIAM C. HOLMES, 1992 ANTITRUST LAW HANDBOOK § 1.03,
at 140 (1992). Examples of illegal antitrust activities include: horizontal price fixing, verti-
cal price fixing, allocation of territories or customers between competitors, group boycotts,
tying agreements, and exclusive dealing agreements. Id. § 1.02, at 138-39.
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activities of labor unions.36 However, in 1914 Congress adopted section 6
of the Clayton Act to protect labor unions.37 Specifically, section 6 pro-
vides that no laws shall prohibit labor unions from carrying out their le-
gitimate objectives. 38 Section 20 of the same Act restricts the injunctive
power of courts in limiting labor union activities. 39 The Norris-LaGuar-
dia Act expands these classifications of protected union activities.41
36. See WEISTART & LOWELL, supra note 1, at 527-28 (noting that prior to 1914. some
courts construed section 1 of the Sherman Act to include labor unions, which negatively
impacted some union movements).
37. Clayton Act, ch, 323, § 6, 38 Stat. 730, 731 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 17
(1988)).
38. 18 U.S.C. § 17 (1988). The Clayton Act provides:
The labor of a human being is not a commodity or article of commerce. Noth-
ing contained in the antitrust laws shall be construed to forbid the existence and
operation of labor, agricultural, or horticultural organizations, instituted for the
purposes of mutual help, and not having capital stock or conducted for profit, or
to forbid or restrain individual members of such organizations from lawfully car-
rying out the legitimate objects thereof; nor shall such organizations, or the mem-
bers thereof, be held or construed to be illegal combinations or conspiracies in
restraint of trade, under the antitrust laws.
Id.
39. Id. § 20, 38 Stat. at 738 (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1988)). Section 20 of
the Clayton Act provides:
No restraining order or injunction shall be granted by any court of the United
States, or a judge or the judges thereof, in any case between an employer and
employees, or between employers and employees, or between employees, or be-
tween persons employed and persons seeking employment, involving, or growing
out of, a dispute concerning terms or conditions of employment, unless necessary
to prevent irreparable injury to property, or to a property right, of the party mak-
ing the application, for which injury there is no adequate remedy at law, and such
property or property right must be described with particularity in the application,
which must be in writing and sworn to by the applicant or by his agent or
attorney.
And no such restraining order or injunction shall prohibit any person or per-
sons, whether singly or in concert, from terminating any relation of employment,
or from ceasing to perform any work or labor, or from recommending, advising,
or persuading others by peaceful means so to do; or from attending at any place
where any such person or persons may lawfully be, for the purpose of peacefully
obtaining or communicating information, or from peacefully persuading any per-
son to work or to abstain from working; or from ceasing to patronize or to employ
any party to such dispute, or from recommending, advising, or persuading others
by peaceful and lawful means so to do; or from paying or giving to, or withholding
from, any person engaged in such dispute, any strike benefits or other moneys or
things of value; or from peaceably assembling in a lawful manner, and for lawful
purposes; or from doing any act or thing which might lawfully be done in the
absence of such dispute by any party thereto; nor shall any of the acts specified in
this paragraph be considered or held to be violations of any law of the United
States.
29 U.S.C. § 52 (1988).
40. Norris-LaGuardia Act, ch. 90, § 4, 47 Stat. 70, 70 (1932) (current version at 29
U.S.C. § 104 (1988)).
19941
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Antitrust laws reflect a national policy favoring economic competition
between industry participants.41 The goal of enhancing competition,
however, must be balanced with a competing national labor policy that
promotes collective bargaining, despite its anticompetitive effect.42
Courts must weigh both the concerns of economic competitors seeking to
enhance profitability and labor unions promoting collective bargaining.43
A. The Statutory Exemption
In United States v. Hutcheson," the United States Supreme Court con-
sidered the validity of union activities within the statutory framework of
labor and antitrust laws.45 In Hutcheson, a carpenters union was accused
of violating section 1 of the Sherman Act by stimulating strikes by work-
ers and a boycott of Anheuser-Busch. 46 The Supreme Court held that the
Sherman Act, sections 6 and 20 of the Clayton Act, and the Norris-La-
Guardia Act are intended to be read together, forming the analytic
framework by which the legality of union activities are judged.47 Accord-
ingly, the Court ruled that Congress intended that union activities benefit
from a statutory exemption from antitrust laws, provided that the union
did not combine with a nonunion group.
48
41. Sherman Antitrust Act, § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988). Section 1 of the Sherman Act
states: "Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is de-
clared to be illegal." Id.
42. See Connell Construction Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local Union No. 100,
421 U.S. 616, 636 (1975) (noting the delicate balance between organized labor and federal
antitrust laws and stating that union activities affect the competition among employers, but
that such effects cannot violate antitrust laws without undermining the intent of federal
labor laws).
43. Allen Bradley Co. v. Local Union No. 3, International Brotherhood of Electrical
Workers, 325 U.S. 797, 806 (1945) (stating that courts are responsible for interpreting con-
gressional intent regarding the degree to which collective bargaining may impinge on the
maintenance of an unrestrained economic environment), superseded by statute as stated in
Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees v. Guilford Transp. Indus., Inc., 803 F.2d
1228 (1st Cir. 1986).
44. 312 U.S. 219 (1941), superseded by statute as stated in Brotherhood of Maintenance
of Way Employees v. Guilford Transp. Indus., Inc., 803 F.2d 1228 (1st Cir. 1986).
45. Id. at 232, 236 (finding that union activities do not violate the Sherman Act, the
Clayton Act, or the Norris-LaGuardia Act).
46. Id. at 220-22 (stating that the union attempted to drive Anheuser-Busch from the
interstate market during a jurisdictional dispute with another union).
47. Id. at 231 (stating that reading the statutes together provides a complete frame-
work of allowable union conduct).
48. Id. at 232 (noting that conduct falling under section 20 of the Clayton Act does not
constitute a crime within the general terms of the Sherman Act).
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In Allen Bradley Co. v. Local Union No. 3, International Brotherhood
of Electrical Workers, 9 the Supreme Court confirmed the Hutcheson rul-
ing by clearly stating that statutory labor exemptions are conditional
upon unions acting alone or solely with other labor groups."' The Court
held that agreements between unions and nonunion groups undermine
congressional intent to end monopolies by effectively fixing prices among
business groups."1 In Allen Bradley Co., contractors committed to
purchase equipment only from manufacturers employing the union's
members.52
B. The Nonstatutory Exemption
The Supreme Court aided congressional attempts to encourage collec-
tive bargaining under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) by cre-
ating a nonstatutory labor exemption.5 3 This exemption extends limited
antitrust protection to agreements that are the product of collective bar-
gaining between labor unions and nonunion groups. 4 The Supreme
Court established the parameters of the nonstatutory exemption in two
leading cases: United Mine Workers v. Pennington55 and Local Union No.
189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen v. Jewel Tea Co.56
In Pennington, the Court refuted the union's assertion that a collective
bargaining agreement automatically will receive a nonstatutory exemp-
tion from antitrust laws. 57 The case centered on an attempt to control the
49. 325 U.S. 797 (1945), superseded by statute as stated in Brotherhood of Maintenance
Way Employees v. Guilford Transp. Indus., Inc., 803 F.2d 1228 (1st Cir. 1986).
50. Id. at 810 (stating that in drafting the Sherman Act, Congress did not intend for
unions to assist nonunion groups in creating monopolies or to control markets).
51. Id. at 809 (commenting that allowing unions and business groups to fix prices
would undermine Congress' efforts to disallow business groups from fixing prices).
52. Id. at 810.
53. Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local Union No. 100, 421 U.S.
616, 622 (1975) (stating that the nonstatutory exemption is the proper balance between two
competing congressional policies, collective bargaining under the NLRA and free competi-
tion in business markets).
The NLRA is the principle law controlling labor relations. ROBERT A. GORMAN, BASIC
TEXT ON LABOR LAW, UNIONIZATION, AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 1 (1976). The
NLRA gives employees the right to organize, form unions, and negotiate collectively with
management through elected representatives. Id. at 5. Furthermore, the NLRA declares
actions by management designed to discourage the formation of labor unions illegal. Id.
Any disputes regarding alleged unfair labor practices are subject to review by the National
Labor Relations Board. Id.
54. Connell Construction Co., 421 U.S. at 622.
55. 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
56. 381 U.S. 676 (1965), superseded by statute as stated in Brotherhood of Maintenance
of Way Employees v. Guilford Transp. Indus., Inc., 803 F.2d 1228 (1st Cir. 1986).
57. Pennington, 381 U.S. at 664-65 (noting that negotiation between the employer and
the union does not necessarily exempt the agreement from other laws).
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production of coal through a collective bargaining agreement between
the United Mine Workers Union and various coal producers.58 Specifi-
cally, the union made concessions regarding mechanized production in
return for increased wages for its members.59 Furthermore, the union
agreed to impose similar wage scales on other coal producers regardless
of their ability to pay the increased production costs. 60 . The union
claimed that the agreement qualified for a nonstatutory labor exemption
because wages were proper subjects of collective bargaining.61
Justice White, writing for the majority, conceded that while negotiating
employment terms and wages is a proper union activity, 62 such an agree-
ment between a union and an employer cannot affect an entire industry.63
In denying a nonstatutory exemption to the agreement in Pennington, the
Court stated that union control of product markets was not a legitimate
union goal and, thus, was not within the protections provided by federal
labor policy.6'
The Supreme Court clarified the analytic framework governing non-
statutory labor exemptions and their relation to union activities in Jewel
Tea Co.65 by holding that a restriction on marketing hours in a collective
bargaining agreement between the union and various meat retailers qual-
ified for a nonstatutory exemption from the Sherman Act.66 The Court
58. Id. at 659-60. Because the parties considered overproduction a major concern, the
union and the larger operators agreed to eliminate smaller companies and to exclude the
marketing, sale, and production of nonunion coal. Id.
59. Id. at 660. The union also abandoned efforts to control miners' hours. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 664. Because statutory exemptions are not available for union-employer
agreements, any exemption must result from judicially created nonstatutory exemptions.
Id. at 662-63.
62. Id. at 666 (the Court recognized that obtaining uniformity of labor standards is a
legitimate union goal).
63. Id. Justice White stated, "[T]here is nothing in the labor policy indicating that the
union and the employers in one bargaining unit are free to bargain about the wages, hours
and working conditions of other bargaining units or to attempt to settle these matters for
the entire industry." Id.
64. Id. at 665-67 (noting that a union can best serve its members by responding to
each bargaining situation individually rather than by attempting to control the product
market).
65. 381 U.S. 676 (1965), superseded by statute as stated in Brotherhood of Maintenance
of Way Employees v. Guilford Transp. Indus., Inc., 803 F.2d 1228 (1st Cir. 1986). This case
involved the legality of a collective bargaining agreement that limited the hours of opera-
tion of meat markets. Id. at 680-81. The defendant union demanded that restrictions on
hours of operations be included in the collective bargaining agreement. Id. The plaintiffs
claimed that the restriction violated sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act because it ad-
versely affected their ability to compete freely within the industry. Id. at 681.
66. Id. at 689-90 (explaining that the marketing hours restriction was intimately re-
lated to wages and working conditions and was exempt from the Sherman Act).
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determined that the agreement resulted from bona fide, arm's-length bar-
gaining and did not involve a nonlabor group.67 Thus, the Court held that
ancillary effects on the product market were insufficient to negate the
collective bargaining and to advance the interests of union members.68
In Connell Construction Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local No.
100,69 the Supreme Court clarified the Jewel Tea Co. balancing approach
that weighed the benefits of a collective bargaining agreement and its
effect on product markets. 71 Considering the acceptability of a hot cargo
agreement,7' the Court determined that the market restraints imposed by
these agreements exceeded those allowable under the balancing ap-
proach.72 Therefore, if a collective bargaining agreement substantially af-
fects market conditions without promoting legitimate union concerns,
courts will not grant antitrust immunity.73
II. THE NONSTATUTORY LABOR EXEMPTION AND THE NATIONAL
BASKETBALL ASSOCIATION
The NBA operates as a joint venture between twenty-seven member
teams. 74 Like other professional sports leagues, the NBA is dependent
67. Id. (stating that because a nonunion group initiated this agreement it was entitled
to consideration for a Sherman Act exemption).
68. Id. at 690-92; see also id. at 690 n.5 (stating that the crucial determinant is not the
form of the agreement but rather it is the relative impact on the product market and the
interests of the union members, keeping in mind the federal policy that encourages collec-
tive bargaining).
69. 421 U.S. 616 (1975).
70. Id. at 622 (commenting that labor policy favoring association of employees never
could be achieved without some ancillary effects on business competition).
71. Id. at 618-21. The hot cargo agreement was a collective bargaining agreement
between the union and local contractors requiring the contractors to hire only subcontrac-
tors who were parties to the collective bargaining agreement. Id.
72. Id. at 621-23. The Court applied the same analytic approach used in Jewel Tea Co.
Id. at 622-23. The Court noted, however, that the Connell Construction Co. Court did not
find a policy reason justifying the direct market restraint based on the advancement of
legitimate union concerns. Id. at 625-26.
73. See id. at 624-26. The union had control over the subcontract work offered by
general contractors, threatening both the product market and consumers. Id.
74. See Chicago Professional Sports Ltd. Partnership v. NBA, 961 F.2d 667, 672-73
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 409 (1992). The Chicago Professional Sports Ltd. case
involved the sale of television broadcast rights of NBA games. Id. In deciding whether the
NBA was a joint venture, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
stated that characterization of the league's teams and their interaction as a joint venture "is
a creative rather than exact endeavor." Id. at 672. Consequently, the Seventh Circuit de-
ferred to the district court's determination that the NBA is a "joint venture in the produc-
tion of games but more like a cartel in the sale of its output." Id. In making this
determination, the Seventh Circuit analogized the marketing strategies and sale of televi-
sion rights of NBA games to the creation of a television series. Id.
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upon the financial success of each team for economic viability.75 One
factor that affects the financial performance of the league is its ability to
attract an audience.76 Consequently, teams seek to maintain competitive
parity and to enhance audience appeal by limiting player movement be-
tween teams.7 7 Limiting player movement controls operating costs by
discouraging open-market bidding wars between teams for a player's
services.78
The collective bargaining agreement between the NBA and the NBPA
represents the negotiated working conditions for the league players. 9
The collective bargaining agreement includes a uniform player contract
that each player must sign, specific salary cap provisions, other criteria
regulating employment within the league, as well as the corresponding
rights granted to players."0 The NBA players compelled the league to
negotiate the labor provisions through collective bargaining by alleging
that past league operating practices violated antitrust laws.81
Courts evaluate labor practices, developed unilaterally by the league's
teams, under traditional antitrust criteria. 2 In Robertson v. NBA,83 the
75. See Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1178-79 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
76. Levine, supra note 1, at 73 (describing the ownership and operating characteristics
of NBA teams that are consistent with the characteristics ascribed to joint ventures). Co-
operation between the teams comprising a professional sports league is necessary to create
an environment that enhances competition among the teams in the league. See Chicago
Professional Sports Ltd., 961 F.2d at 672. The economic viability of a professional sports
league is dependent upon its ability to market a product capable of attracting an audience,
despite competition from other sports and other forms of entertainment. Id.
77. Levine, supra note 1, at 73, 98-99. Competitive parity is achieved by distributing
the NBA's most talented players evenly throughout the league. Id.
78. Id. at 73 (asserting that bidding wars begin when owners, regardless of their finan-
cial situation, offer free agents large salaries in an effort to procure the services of the best
players).
79. See Agreement, supra note 3, at i-2.
80. Id. The Agreement also notes exceptions to the salary cap and other labor provi-
sions negotiated between the league and the players.
81. See Bridgeman v. NBA, 675 F. Supp. 960, 962 (D.N.J. 1987) (alleging that past
operations including the college draft, the uniform player contract, and the reserve clause
were violations of federal antitrust laws); Wood v. NBA, 602 F. Supp. 525, 527 (S.D.N.Y.
1984), aff'd, 809 F.2d 954 (2d Cir. 1987); Robertson v. NBA, 389 F. Supp. 867, 873-75
(S.D.N.Y. 1975).
82. See, e.g., Wood v. NBA, 809 F.2d 954, 958-62 (2d Cir. 1987); Robertson, 389 F.
Supp. at 884-90. In Wood, the Second Circuit stated that Connell Construction Co., Jewel
Tea Co., and Pennington were "so clearly distinguishable that they need not detain us."
Wood, 809 F.2d at 963.
83. 389 F. Supp. at 867, 886-87. The district court ruled that players have standing to
bring suit against professional sports leagues despite congressional intent to encourage set-
tling labor disputes through collective bargaining. See id. at 882-83. According to section 4
of the Clayton Act, any person injured in his business because of an action forbidden by
the antitrust law has standing to bring suit against an employer. Id. at 882 (citing Clayton
Act, § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15). In professional sports, courts generally have granted standing to
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United States District Court for the Southern District of New York evalu-
ated labor provisions that NBA players challenged in a class action suit
under the balancing approach established in Pennington,84 Jewel Tea
Co.,85 and Connell Construction Co.86 The district court's holding in
Robertson indicated that labor practices deemed necessary by the league
would fail antitrust scrutiny unless they resulted from collective
bargaining.87
A. Robertson v. NBA: The Precursor to Collective Bargaining
In 1970, NBA players brought a class action suit alleging that various
league practices violated sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act and sec-
tions 4 and 6 of the Clayton Act.88 The suit, brought on behalf of all
present and future NBA players, sought relief from the league's college
players bringing suit against the league for potentially damaging practices, such as player
restraint clauses. Id. at 883.
The NBA argued in Robertson that the players could not bring suit against the league
because the contested labor practices were covered by a labor exemption from antitrust
laws. Id. at 884. The Robertson court denied this claim because labor exemptions, which
have their statutory basis in sections 6 and 20 of the Clayton Act, are only available for
union actions. Id. at 884-85. Congress intended these sections to protect union activities
without also offering protection to the activities of employers. Id. Employers may be ex-
empt from antitrust action, however, if the specific labor practice has been the subject of
collective bargaining. Id. at 886. Based on the precedent set in Philadelphia World
Hockey Club, Inc. v. Philadelphia Hockey Club, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 462 (E.D. Pa. 1972), the
court stated that such an exemption is predicated on the labor practice being "the 'subject
of serious, intensive, arm's length collective bargaining.' " Robertson, 389 F. Supp. at 895
(quoting Philadelphia World Hockey Club, Inc., 351 F. Supp. at 499). The Robertson court
indicated that the NBA's assertion that the NBPA would have agreed to player restraints
lacked credibility, but, nevertheless would be determined at a trial on the merits. Id. The
possibility that an exemption existed, however, spawned a willingness on the part of the
Robertson court to consider evidence of negotiations between the NBA and the NBPA.
Id. at 884-90. It appears that the Robertson court agreed with the court in Philadelphia
Hockey Club, Inc. that the labor exemption will apply only when the union has approved
of the labor action, not when the employer's actions were unilateral. Id.
84. 381 U.S. 657, 665-66 (1965) (holding that a union can make agreements with mul-
tiemployer bargaining units, but forfeits antitrust exemptions when it agrees with one em-
ployer to impose a wage scale on other bargaining units); see supra note 53 and
accompanying text.
85. 381 U.S. 676, 689 (1965) (holding that exempting union-employer agreements from
the Sherman Act is intended to accommodate labor law policy), superseded by statute as
stated in Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees v. Guilford Transp. Indus., Inc.,
803 F.2d 1228 (1st Cir. 1986); see supra note 54 and accompanying text.
86. 421 U.S. 616, 621-26 (1975) (holding that an agreement between the union and
employer did not qualify for a nonstatutory exemption because it imposed direct restraints
on competition among subcontractors by excluding any nonunion firm); see supra note 51
and accompanying text.
87. Robertson, 389 F. Supp. at 880-81.
88. Id. at 872.
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draft,89 the uniform player contract,90 the reserve clause, 91 and various
other practices 92 that the players characterized as blacklisting and group
boycotts.93 Commonly, players entered into the league by selection in a
college draft and the team that drafted the player retained the rights to
that player's services indefinitely. 94 League teams were free to sell or
trade a player's rights, while a player had no comparable right to negoti-
ate with another team.95 Every team in the league engaged in these prac-
tices, thus restricting player movement.96 The players contended that
such restraints violated section 1 of the Sherman Act,97 which prohibits
any contract restraining trade.98
In evaluating whether the challenged practices violated the Sherman
Act, the United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York utilized Supreme Court precedent in applying the "per se" 99 and
"rule of reason" tests.100 The per se test for unreasonableness examines
89. Each NBA team is given the exclusive right to select college players and thereafter
retains the exclusive right to negotiate for the players' services. Id. at 874. Players are not
free to negotiate to play for any other team in the league for as long as the drafting team
retains their rights. Id.
90. After being drafted, every player must sign a " 'National Basketball Association
Uniform Contract'" (Uniform Contract) to play with a team in the NBA. Id. Veteran
players sign a Uniform Contract each year. Id. The contract provides that the player will
play for that particular team until he is " 'sold'" or " 'traded'" to another team. Id.
91. "The Reserve Clause is a part of the Uniform Contract which, if a player refuses to
sign the Uniform Contract for the next playing season, empowers the club unilaterally to
renew and extend the Uniform Contract for one year on the same terms and conditions
including salary." id. at 875 (emphasis omitted). "Prior to 1971, the contract could be
unilaterally renewed with a 25% reduction in salary, but this provision was dropped by the
NBA in 1971, and the renewal is at the same salary." Id. at 874 n.7.
92. The players cited the refusal of teams to negotiate with players who signed or
refused to sign a Uniform Contract with another team, were voluntarily retired from an-
other team, was under suspension, in military service, disabled, or injured. Id. at 874. Any
team that negotiated or contracted with such a player was allegedly boycotted, blacklisted,
or otherwise penalized. Id. Further, the players contended that the league banned them
from negotiating with teams in ihe American Basketball Association, a rival league. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. WEISTART & LOWELL, supra note 1, § 5.07, at 592 (considering the college draft,
the reserve clause, and the indemnity arrangements).
97. See supra note 41 for the text of section 1 of the Sherman Act.
98. WEISTART & LOWELL, supra note 1, § 5.07, at 592 (stating that section 1 of the
Sherman Act declares " 'every' " contract or combination in restraint of trade illegal).
99. Robertson, 389 F. Supp. at 893. Under the per se test, the plaintiff must show that
a business practice plainly hinders competition and is per se unreasonable. HOLMES, supra
note 35, § 1.04[1], at 160. Once the plaintiff demonstrates that a per se unreasonable event
has occurred, he has satisfied the burden of proof. Id.
100. Robertson, 389 F. Supp. at 893. Under the rule of reason test, a more exhaustive
examination of the trade practice is made by courts comparing the effect on competitive-
ness with the necessity of the business practice. HOLMES, supra note 35, § 1.04[1], at 161.
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labor practices to determine whether they are so anticompetitive as to
constitute a per se violation of antitrust laws. 101 If a labor practice is per
se unreasonable, the court can avoid the more detailed analysis necessary
under the rule of reason test.' 0 2 The district court indicated that the
player draft and perpetual reserve system appeared analogous to group
boycotts and thus would be per se illegal. 10 3 The court did not declare
the reserve system employed by the NBA per se unreasonable because of
potentially detrimental effects on competitiveness.104
The Supreme Court established the rule of reason test in Standard Oil
Co. v. United States10 5 and in Board of Trade v. United States' °6 as an
alternative to the per se test.' 0 7 The rule of reason test determines
whether a challenged restraint is justified by a legitimate business interest
that imposes no greater restrictions than necessary.10 8 This approach
considers the history and economics of the relevant industry against the
reasonableness of the restraint of trade. 109 If a clear economic necessity
for the restriction is supported and the dominant purpose is not to re-
101. Robertson, 389 F. Supp. at 893 (noting that using the per se test allows the court to
avoid a more onerous examination under the rule of reason test).
102. Id. Certain agreements are so anticompetitive that they are presumed to be illegal
and do not require an elaborate inquiry into the precise harm they have caused. Northern
Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958). The practices that the Supreme Court has
declared as per se violations of the Sherman Act include horizontal price fixing, territorial
division of markets, and secondary or group boycotts. Robertson, 389 F. Supp. at 893.
103. Robertson, 389 F. Supp. at 893.
104. See id. at 896. Courts, however, are hesitant to declare labor activities in profes-
sional sports per se unreasonable because of the potential for harm to the league's compet-
itive balance. Id. at 894.
105. 221 U.S. 1, 65-66 (1911).
106. 246 U.S. 231, 239 (1918).
107. See Robertson, 389 F. Supp. at 892; see also Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc.
v. Pacific Stationer & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284, 293-98 (1985) (determining that absent a
showing of a cooperative buying arrangement, courts should apply the rule of reason anal-
ysis); National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 104-13 (1984)
(concluding that a fair evaluation of the competitive character of the members of the Na-
tional Collegiate Athletic Association requires the application of the rule of reason, not the
per se analysis); National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 690(1978) (stating that the test "is whether the challenge contracts or acts 'were unreasonably
restrictive of competitive conditions' " with "[u]nreasonableness ... based either: (1) on
the nature or character of the contracts, or (2) on the surrounding circumstances giving rise
to the inference or presumption that they were intended to restrain trade and enhance
prices").
108. Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 620 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. dis-
missed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977); see supra note 9 and accompanying text.
109. Robertson, 389 F. Supp. at 893. The finder of fact weighs all relevant circum-
stances, including the competitive environment within the affected industry and the justifi-
cations offered by the defendant, to determine whether a given restriction is reasonable.
HOLMES, supra note 35, § 1.04[2], at 164.
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strain trade, the practice will be declared reasonable.11 ° Because the re-
strictions on players enforced by the NBA would fail the per se test,
however, further examination was not necessary in Robertson."1
B. Developing an Analytic Framework for Antitrust Claims in
Professional Sports
In applying labor principles to player restraints in professional sports,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit articulated a
three-pronged test in Mackey v. National Football League.1 1 2 This test
requires that the restraint of trade only affect parties to the collective
bargaining relationship; that the agreement only concern mandatory sub-
jects of collective bargaining; and that the agreement be the product of
bona fide, arm's-length bargaining. 13
In Mackey, the Eighth Circuit applied the test to the "Rozelle Rule,"
which regulated free agency in professional football by requiring a team
that signs another team's free agent player to compensate that player's
former team.l"4 If an agreement as to the compensation was not reached,
the commissioner of the league determined what was fair and equitable
compensation to the former team. 115 The Eighth Circuit found that the
Rozelle Rule satisfied the first two prongs of the standard." 6 The court,
however, determined that the Rozelle Rule did not satisfy the test's third
criterion because it was not the subject of bona fide, arm's-length bar-
110. Robertson, 389 F. Supp. at 893; see HOLMES, supra note 35, § 1.04[2], at 163-64
(examining practices that are not per se illegal but instead are governed by the rule of
reason test). The examination of evidence regarding the nature of the restraint and its
effects is not intended to allow anticompetitive regulations to survive antitrust inquiries
solely because of a positive intent. Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1205 (D.C.
Cir. 1978). The purpose of a broad inquiry under a rule of reason analysis is to assist the
court in determining the potential consequences of a given regulation's impact on competi-
tion. Id. at 1206. Anticompetitive effects alone may not be enough to invalidate a restric-
tion. Id. Under the tests established in Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 55
(1911), Board of Trade, 246 U.S. at 238, and National Society of Professional Engineers v.
United States, 435 U.S. 679, 693-95 (1978), a restraint that has long-term pro-competitive
benefits may be valid. Smith, 593 F.2d at 1206. Consequently, all restraints must be ex-
amined in the context of their effect on the entire industry. Id.
111. Robertson, 389 F. Supp. at 893.
112. 543 F.2d at 609, 614.
113. Id. at 614.
114. Id. at 610. The rule is named after Pete Rozelle, former Commissioner of the
NFL. Id. The challenged rule was found to deter significant player movement between
teams through free agency. Id. at 615.
115. Id. at 610-11.
116. Id. at 615. The Rozelle Rule affects only the parties to the agreement. Id. The
'Eighth Circuit further determined that the Rozelle Rule constituted a mandatory bargain-
ing subject within the NLRA. Id. Mandatory subjects of collective bargaining include
wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment. Id.
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gaining.117 Consequently, the Rozelle Rule did not qualify for a labor
exemption." 8
Because Mackey had not yet been decided, the Robertson court evalu-
ated the challenges to league policies based on the per se and rule of
reason tests of reasonableness.' 1 9 Since Robertson, however, the Mackey
test has become the basis for granting a nonstatutory exemption uphold-
ing the challenged labor practice.' 20
C. Expiration of the Collective Bargaining Agreement Does Not
Invalidate Its Terms
1. Bridgeman v. NBA: Negotiated Provisions Apply Until Impasse
In 1987, a class of NBA players moved for partial summary judgment
and a declaratory judgment that player restraints included in the collec-
tive bargaining agreement were not exempt from antitrust laws in
Bridgeman v. NBA.121 The players claimed that upon expiration the
agreement's provisions were no longer binding.1 22 The NBA teams, how-
ever, continued to operate under the terms of the expired collective bar-
117. Id. at 616.
118. Id.
119. Robertson v. NBA, 389 F. Supp. 867, 890-93 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
120. Mackey, 543 F.2d at 615-16. The acceptance of the Mackey test has led to the
failure to apply the traditional tests of antitrust violations, which are the per se and rule of
reason analyses. Id. Some labor practices are considered so inherently harmful to compet-
itiveness that they are judged to be per se illegal. Id. at 618. These categories include
concerted refusals to deal and group boycotts. Id. Although the express language of the
Sherman Act is broad enough to render most types of business agreements illegal, "[t]he
Supreme Court has held . . . that only those agreements which 'unreasonably' restrain
trade come within the proscription of the Act," which is analyzed through the rule of rea-
son test. Id.
The primary concern of the rule of reason analysis is to determine whether the labor
provision is no more restrictive than necessary to accomplish a legitimate business purpose.
Id. at 620-21. In the Mackey case, the stated purpose of the Rozelle Rule was to maintain
the financial viability of each league team and the competitive balance in the league. Id. at
621. In other cases involving professional sports, the courts have not deemed financial
criteria sufficient to justify labor provisions that inhibit competition in the market. Id. The
Mackey court held that limitations on player movement such as the Rozelle Rule were not
the least restrictive means available to protect competitive parity. Id.
121. Bridgeman v. NBA, 675 F. Supp. 960, 961-63 (D.N.J. 1987).
122. Id. at 964. In the Williams opinion, Judge Duffy stated that the NBA and the
NBPA used the courts to gain leverage during negotiation of the collective bargaining
agreement. NBA v. Williams, 857 F. Supp. 1069, 1073 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). As such, Judge
Duffy commented that the proper resolution of the labor disputes is negotiation rather
than litigation. Id. In support of his position, Judge Duffy reviewed the legal challenges to
labor provisions following expiration of the collective bargaining agreement since 1970. Id.
at 1071-73. In this review, a pattern emerged whereby various labor practices that had
been challenged on antitrust grounds were later included in the newly negotiated collective
bargaining agreement. Id.
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gaining agreement, contending that the terms of the collective bargaining
agreement should continue as long as they were applied without
modification. 123
In reviewing these claims, the court examined an issue beyond the
scope of Mackey: whether the expiration of the collective bargaining
agreement affects the availability of the labor exemption.124 The United
States District Court for the District of New Jersey found that protecting
practices that were the subject of arm's-length bargaining fostered good
faith negotiations.125 Moreover, both parties had an obligation to main-
tain the status quo even after impasse.' 26 Removing antitrust protection
immediately upon expiration of the collective bargaining agreement
would be contrary to the purpose of the nonstatutory exemption and the
federal labor policy of encouraging collective bargaining. 127
123. Bridgeman, 675 F. Supp. at 964-65 (contrasting the league's position with the play-
ers' position that these terms expired with the agreement).
124. Id. at 965.
125. Id.
126. Id. The district court explained:
Under the NLRA, impasse exists when the parties have exhausted the pros-
pects of concluding an agreement and further discussions would be fruitless. The
National Labor Relations Board has summarized the factors to be considered in
determining the existence of an impasse as follows:
"Whether a bargaining impasse exists is a matter of judgment. The
bargaining history, the good faith of the parties in negotiations, the
length of the negotiations, the importance of the issue or issues as to
which there is disagreement, the contemporaneous understanding of the
parties as to the state of negotiations, are all relevant factors to be con-
sidered in deciding whether an impasse in bargaining existed."
Id. at 966 n.5 (quoting Taft Broadcasting Co., 163 N.L.R.B. 475 (1967), review denied,
American Fed'n of Television & Radio Artists v. NLRB. 395 F.2d 622 (U.S. App. D.C.
1968)); see also Powell v. National Football League, 930 F.2d 1293, 1300-01 (8th Cir. 1980)
(discussing the parties' obligations upon reaching an impasse).
127. Bridgeman, 675 F. Supp. at 965; see Powell, 930 F.2d at 1302. Immediate removal
of immunity at impasse would undermine the collective bargaining process. Id. The par-
ties would be unable to continue negotiation without the threat of being found in violation
of antitrust laws. Id.
In Bridgeman, the district court underscored the importance of avoiding labor disputes
by maintaining the terms of the collective bargaining agreement that recognized the agree-
ment's continued validity after its expiration. Bridgeman, 675 F. Supp. at 965. The players
argued unsuccessfully that the expiration of the agreement freed them from its restraints.
Id. The district court, however, reasoned that if the parties reasonably believe that certain
provisions will be included in a new collective bargaining agreement, the provisions should
remain in effect after expiration of the agreement. Id. The labor concept of impasse,
which is essentially the period between expiration of a collective bargaining agreement and
the establishment of a new collective bargaining agreement, served as the basis of the rea-
soning. Id. at 966 n.5. Impasse encourages collective bargaining because it is the most
efficient means for either party to alter the expired collective bargaining agreement. Id. at
966-67. Accepting the players' claim would have undermined the collective bargaining
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The district court limited its holding by stating that the antitrust exemp-
tion would not continue indefinitely after the collective bargaining agree-
ment expired.1 28  While not defining a time limitation, the court
determined that the exemption would apply during impasse. 129 The dis-
trict court stated that the exemption survived only as long as employers
did not modify the terms of the collective bargaining agreement. 130 Ad-
ditionally, the employer reasonably must believe that the restriction at
issue will be included in the new agreement. 3 '
Courts have demonstrated a desire to support contractual obligations
created through collective bargaining. 132 Players continually raise anti-
trust challenges to the legality of labor provisions at the expiration of the
collective bargaining agreement.' 33 These challenges may be an attempt
to gain a bargaining advantage because a demonstration that the provi-
sions violate antitrust laws would render illegal any provisions not part of
a collective bargaining agreement.' 34 Courts, however, are unwilling to
consider the antitrust allegations while a collective bargaining relation-
ship continues to exist.'
35
relationship because the players could have ignored the agreement's restraints during the
negotiating process. Id. at 965.
128. Bridgeman, 675 F. Supp. at 966; see Powell, 930 F.2d at 1301.
129. Bridgeman 675 F. Supp. at 967. Impasse is a labor law concept developed to cope
with the problems created when parties reach a deadlock in negotiations. Id. at 966-67; see
supra note 127 (discussing impasses under the NRLA).
130. Bridgeman, 675 F. Supp. at 967.
131. Id. As the Second Circuit stated,
the employer continues to impose [the] restriction unchanged, anti reasonably
believes that the practice or a close variant of it will be incorporated in the next
collective bargaining agreement. When the employer no longer has such a rea-
sonable belief, it is then unilaterally imposing the restriction on its employees,
and the restraint can no longer be deemed the product of arm's-length negotia-
tion between the union and the employer.
Id. (footnote omitted).
Should impasse occur, employers may invoke employment terms that are different than
the terms in the expired collective bargaining agreement. Laborers Health & Welfare
Trust Fund v. Advanced Lightweight Concrete Co., 484 U.S. 539, 542 (1988). If the new
terms differ from the terms that the parties proposed or agreed to prior to impasse, how-
ever, the employer may be vulnerable to attack for violating labor laws. Powell, 930 F.2d
at 1301.
132. Bridgeman, 675 F. Supp. at 964-65; see Powell, 930 F.2d at 1303.
133. See Bridgeman, 675 F. Supp. at 962-63 (explaining player resistance to be bound
by the terms of the prior agreement).
134. See NBA v. Williams, 857 F. Supp. 1069, 1079 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (stating that provi-
sions such as the college draft, right of first refusal, and salary cap do not violate the per se
test and, consequently, their legitimacy will be judged according to the rule of reason test).
135. See id.
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2. Courts Encourage Settlement Through Negotiation
In the summer of 1994, the NBA sought a declaratory order concluding
that the college draft, the right of first refusal, and the salary cap did not
violate antitrust laws.' 3 6 The NBA initiated the action in response to a
letter delivered to it by the NBPA stating that because the collective bar-
gaining agreement between the parties had expired, the labor provisions
violated antitrust laws.137 The parties did not dispute that the provisions
qualified for the nonstatutory exemption from antitrust laws prior to the
expiration of the bargaining agreement. 138 Therefore, the court was first
to determine when such an exemption ceased to apply.' 39 The United
136. Id. at 1071. The players brought counterclaims, through the NBPA, seeking a tem-
porary restraining order and preliminary injunction that would have barred teams from
signing players and expedited a trial of the merits of the NBA's claims. Id. The district
court granted the temporary restraining order on June 28, 1994. Id. At a hearing on July 8,
1994, Judge Duffy ordered a trial on the merits for July 11, 1994. Id.
137. Id. at 1072-73. The 1988 collective bargaining agreement formally expired on June
23, 1994. Id. at 1072. In a bargaining session on April 7, 1994, the NBPA insisted that the
college draft, the right of first refusal, and the salary cap be eliminated from future collec-
tive bargaining agreements. Id.
138. Id. at 1074.
139. Id. In considering the question of how long a nonstatutory exemption exists after
the expiration of a collective bargaining relationship, Judge Duffy looked to four other
cases that considered the issue with regard to professional sports. Id. at 1074-76. In Wood
v. NBA, the Second Circuit held that antitrust laws cannot subvert federal labor policy. Id.
at 1074. For a discussion of the Wood case, see infra notes 201-10 and accompanying text.
Consequently, Judge Duffy stated that the law of the Second Circuit seemed to be that
federal labor law should apply to disputes between bargaining parties. Williams, 857 F.
Supp. at 1074. The other decisions he considered regarding the expiration of bargaining
agreements were from other jurisdictions and therefore lacked precedential effect. Id.
The first case considered by Judge Duffy was Bridgeman v. NBA. Id. For a discussion of
the Bridgeman case, see supra notes 121-33 and accompanying text. Bridgeman was factu-
ally identical to Williams. Williams, 857 F. Supp. at 1074. Judge Duffy explained that the
Bridgeman court rejected the assertions of the NBPA that antitrust immunity expires with
the collective bargaining agreement. Id. Likewise, the Bridgeman court rejected the view
that antitrust immunity continues indefinitely. Id. The Bridgeman court warned that such
a holding would discourage unions from ever entering into a collective bargaining agree-
ments because the union then would be unable to challenge the terms of the agreement in
the future. Id. at 1074-75. Thus, the Bridgeman court drew upon the elements of the
Mackey test regarding the likelihood that the disputed provisions will become part of fu-
ture agreements. Id. at 1075; see infra note 160 (explaining the Mackey test). The Wil-
liams court then held that antitrust immunity exists as long as employers impose the
restrictions in the same manner as before the expiration of the agreement and they reason-
ably believe that the provision will be included in future agreements. Williams, 857 F.
Supp. at 1075.
The second case cited by Judge Duffy was Powell v. National Football League, where a
United States District Court for the District of Minnesota considered whether the NFL
could restrict player movement after the expiration of a collective bargaining agreement.
Id. Judge Duffy noted that the Powell court held that immunity exists until the parties
have reached impasse. Id.
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States District Court for the Southern District of New York, in NBA v.
Williams, considered the balancing of labor policies and antitrust laws.
1 41
Because the case primarily concerned a labor market dispute, federal la-
bor law would apply. 4' Consequently, the antitrust immunity survives as
long as a collective bargaining relationship exists.1
42
In addressing the NBPA's contention that the labor provisions would
fail antitrust scrutiny if the court removed the nonstatutory exemption,
the court utilized both the per se and rule of reason tests.1 43 The court
held that the challenged provisions would not fail a per se test because
professional sports leagues are joint ventures and therefore are not vul-
nerable to per se challenges.'" Consequently, the labor provisions are
The third case considered by Judge Duffy was the Eighth Circuit's decision in Powell v.
National Football League (Powell II), which reversed the district court's ruling. Id. Judge
Duffy explained that in Powell H, the Eighth Circuit held that immunity exists beyond
impasse and continues as long as there is a labor relationship between the league and the
union. Id. Essentially, Judge Duffy stated "once a collective bargaining arrangement is
established, and a valid and bona fide collective bargaining agreement is formed, federal
labor law and its policies control." Id. Therefore, Judge Duffy concluded that as long as
labor law remedies are available, the parties should be forced to settle their disputes
through negotiation. Id.
The final case considered by Judge Duffy was Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., where the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia considered whether salary restric-
tions continued after the expiration of the collective bargaining agreement. Id. at 1076.
Judge Duffy noted that in Brown, the district court held that the salary restrictions did
expired with the agreement. Id. The Brown court reasoned that allowing the exemption
to continue after expiration discouraged serious negotiation by the employer, who would
be content to continue under the terms of the agreement. Id. Judge Duffy further ex-
plained that the Brown court held that extending the exemption deprived the union of
potentially receiving treble damages available under labor law. Id.
140. Id. In his opinion, Judge Duffy quoted from Allen Bradley Co. v. Local Union No.
3, International Brotherhood of Electric Workers, regarding the role of the courts in deter-
mining how Congress intended antitrust laws and labor policy to interact. Id.; see supra
note 43 (discussing the Allen Bradley Co. decision).
141. Williams, 857 F. Supp..at 1078. Judge Duffy further stated that the NBPA had
misread the precedential cases, which indicated that labor provisions lose there antitrust
exemption upon expiration of the agreement. Id. at 1077. Specifically, Judge Duffy noted
that no previous Supreme Court decision addressed a circumstance where the parties had
engaged in collective bargaining as representatives authorized by labor law. Id.
142. Id. at 1078.
143. Id. The NBPA contended that the college draft, right of first refusal, and the sal-
ary cap were per se violations of section 1 of the Sherman Act. Id.
144. Id. Judge Duffy relied on the Board of Trade v. United States to explain:
"Certain agreements, such as horizontal price fixing and market allocation, are
thought so inherently anti-competitive that each is illegal per se without inquiry
into the harm it has actually caused. Other combinations, such as mergers, joint
ventures, and various vertical agreements, hold the promise of increasing a firm's
efficiency and enabling it to compete more effectively. Accordingly, such combi-
nations are judged under a rule of reason, an inquiry into market power and mar-
ket structure designed to assess the combination's actual effect."
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correctly assessed according to the rule of reason. 145 The court held,
however, that the NBPA had not proven that the labor provisions violate
the rule of reason standard by being unreasonably anticompetitive.
146
The procompetitive effects of the labor provisions may outweigh their
restrictive consequences if the league's competitive balance is
enhanced. 47
III. ESTABLISHING LABOR POLICIES IN THE NBA THROUGH
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
A. Setting the Stage for Collective Bargaining
The legacy of Robertson is the recognition that player restraints may
avoid being classified as per se violations of antitrust laws if they result
from collective bargaining. 148 To qualify for the nonstatutory exemption
to antitrust laws, the NBA and the NBPA entered into a collective bar-
gaining relationship regarding labor provisions.' 49 This agreement al-
tered the league's labor practices by invalidating the reserve clause,
granting a limited form of free agency, and amending the college draft.'
50
Thus, by participating in collective bargaining, the players achieved their
goal of increasing mobility.15' Likewise, the league was able to control
player movement between teams, which it considered essential to main-
taining stability within the league. 52
Id. (quoting Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 768 (1983)).
145. Williams, 857 F. Supp. at 1079.
146. Id. In fact, Judge Duffy pointed out that the salary cap enhanced the mutual inter-
ests of the NBA and the NBPA by regulating labor costs in return for the players receiving
53% of the DGR of the league. Id.; see supra note 3 (discussing DGR).
147. Williams, 857 F. Supp. at 1079.
148. Robertson v. NBA, 389 F. Supp. 867, 895 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (requiring that such
restrictions must be deemed by the NBPA to be in the players' best interest and the result
of arm's-length collective bargaining), aff'd, 556 F.2d 682 (2d Cir. 1977).
149. WEISTART & LOWELL, supra note 1, § 5.03, at 507. The NBA and the NBPA com-
pleted the first collective bargaining agreement in 1976. Id.
150. Id. § 5.03, at 508. The reserve clause allowed unilateral renewal of a player's con-
tract. Id. The parties approved a limited form of free agency that gave a player's original
team a right of first refusal. Id. The original team could retain a player's services by
matching the terms of the player's new team's offer. Id.
If the original team did not match the offer, 'the new team was required to provide com-
pensation for the player. Id. Also, the college draft was amended to permit the drafting
team to retain a player's rights for one year, rather than indefinitely as had been the case.
Id.
151. Id. § 5.03, at 507-08. Under the new system, the teams lost the right to renew a
player's contract unilaterally. Id. § 5.03, at 508.
152. Id. Players first entering the NBA were subject to the draft system, which deter-
mined the team that acquired the player's rights. Id.
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The Robertson holding, which did not invalidate the labor provisions
challenged by the players, is consistent with traditional judicial reluctance
to dictate labor provisions in professional sports.153 Requiring that the
provisions result from collective bargaining, however, provided some pro-
tection to the players from unilaterally imposed labor policies.'5 4 The
Robertson settlement complies with the labor exemption from antitrust
laws, found in sections 6 and 20 of the Clayton Act' 55 and the Norris-
LaGuardia Act.' 56 The Supreme Court created this nonstatutory exemp-
tion to encourage collective bargaining, despite possible anticompetitive
ramifications.' 57 Courts must determine that the relevant labor policy is
worthy of preeminence over federal antitrust policy.' 58 In professional
basketball and other professional sports this requirement is satisfied be-
cause teams are not economic competitors.159 Consequently, courts alter
the traditional balancing approach typically applied to labor disputes in
other industries when antitrust violations are alleged in professional
sports. 6°
153. See Foraker, supra note 2, at 168-69. Judge Carter applied a restrictive view of
labor exemptions in the Robertson decision. Id. at 167. In dicta, Judge Carter wrote:
I must confess that it is difficult for me to conceive of any theory or set of
circumstances pursuant to which the college draft, blacklisting, boycotts, and re-
fusals to deal could be saved from Sherman Act condemnation, even if defend-
ants were able to prove at trial their highly dubious contention that these
restraints were adopted at the behest of the Players Association.
Robertson v. NBA, 389 F. Supp. 867, 895 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
154. See Foraker, supra note 2, at 169.
155. Robertson, 389 F. Supp. at 884; see Clayton Act, § 6, 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1988); Clay-
ton Act, § 20, 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1988).
156. Robertson, 389 F. Supp. at 884; see Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 104, 105,
113 (1988).
157. Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 512-13 (1940) (holding that activities of
labor organizations that restrain trade are not necessarily violations of the Sherman Act).
158. Connell Const. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local Union No. 100, 421 U.S. 616,
621-22 (1975).
159. Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1178-79 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (stating that
joint action by rival clubs in the NFL does not run afoul of antitrust measures because each
team is dependent on the revenues of the other team for the financial survival of the
league).
160. In Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. dis-
missed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977), the Eighth Circuit adopted a three-pronged test to address
antitrust issues in professional sports. Id. at 615-22.
The first prong of Mackey requires that the agreement affect only the parties to the
negotiation. Mackey, 543 F.2d at 615. In professional basketball, the parties to the negoti-
ation are the NBA and the NBPA, which negotiates on behalf of all current and future
NBA players. Wood v. NBA, 602 F. Supp. 525, 529 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), aff'd, 809 F.2d 954
(2d Cir. 1987). While such a role facilitates the resolution of a labor dispute, it demon-
strates an unusually broad scope of power for the NBPA. Id. The current players in the
league can elect player representatives to represent their interests with the union. Id.
However, because Wood and other similarly situated players coming out of college are not
1994]
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In 1983, the NBA and the NBPA amended the collective bargaining
agreement to include additional labor provisions, including the salary
cap. 16 1 This amendment established a formula for determining the maxi-
mum aggregate amount teams may pay players annually.162 By uphold-
ing the written terms of the document, courts have encouraged the
collective bargaining process in professional basketball.'
63
B. Upholding the Salary Cap Through Narrow Construction
of Its Provisions
In addition to holding both the league and its players to the express
terms of the collective bargaining agreement, courts have supported the
agreement's provisions further by binding all prospective players to the
agreement's terms.164 For instance, in Wood v. NBA, Leon Wood con-
tended that the NBPA did not represent him in their negotiations with
the league, and consequently, he should not be bound by the agree-
ment. 165 The Second Circuit stated that Wood based his complaint on his
alleged inability to receive the full market value for his talents because of
the salary cap.
166
members of the league, it is difficult to see how the union could be representing their
interests. Id. In Wood, the Second Circuit analogized the union's power as sole negotiator
for players by referring to hiring halls and the role of unions in more traditional industries.
Wood v. NBA, 809 F.2d 954, 960 (2d Cir. 1987). However, the Robertson court discussed
the role of unions in professional sports and specifically determined that draft choices are
outside of the bargaining unit as it applies to collective bargaining agreements. Robertson,
389 F. Supp. at 870.
The second prong of the Mackey test requires that the provisions being negotiated must
be mandatory subjects of collective bargaining. Mackey, 543 F.2d at 615. Mandatory sub-
jects of collective bargaining include such topics as wages, hours, and terms and conditions
of employment. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1988); see Mackey, 543 F.2d at 615. According to the
NLRA, employers have a good faith duty to negotiate these labor provisions. McCourt v.
California Sports, Inc., 600 F.2d 1193, 1200 (6th Cir. 1979). However, wage negotiations in
professional sports are between an individual player and his team, not between the player
and the league. Daspin, supra note 13, at 111.
The final prong of the Mackey test requires the provision to result from bona fide, arm's-
length collective bargaining. Mackey, 543 F.2d at 615-16. One commentator argues that
the bargaining that resulted in the creation of the salary cap cannot satisfy this prong be-
cause the bargaining objectives were illegal. Daspin, supra note 13, at 117.
161. Wood, 602 F. Supp. at 528.
162. Agreement, supra note 3, art. VII.
163. See Wood, 602 F. Supp. at 528.
164. See Wood, 809 F.2d at 960 (stating that unsigned rookies are not at a greater disad-
vantage, in terms of bargaining power, than new employees in other industries regarding
unions).
165. Id.
166. Id.
1994] NBA Salary Cap
The Second Circuit recognized that professional athletes receive more
publicity than workers in other industries, but held that professional ath-
letes are restricted by federal labor policy if their employment is gov-
erned by a collective bargaining agreement. 167 Thus, Wood was bound by
the collective bargaining agreement by virtue of section 9(a) of the
NLRA, 168 which allows a majority of employees to appoint an exclusive
representative for collective bargaining. 169 The NBPA is allowed to ne-
gotiate a salary cap on behalf of all current and future players because in
other industries, collective bargaining agreements frequently set standard
wages without regard to the specific talents or abilities of an individual
employee. 70
The Second Circuit evaluated the importance of collective bargaining
and the freedom to contract between the NBA and the NBPA. 171 Sup-
porting the freedom to contract between employers and employees fos-
ters agreements tailored to their specific needs and promotes labor
peace.' 72 If the district court allowed Wood to challenge the authority of
the NBPA, it would upset the collective bargaining process, thereby de-
creasing the efficiency of dispute resolution.'73 The Second Circuit
opined that the collective bargaining relationship between the NBA and
the NBPA illustrated the creativity of an unfettered bargaining system.1
74
167. Id.
168. See id. at 959 (stating that federal labor policy through section 9(a) of the NLRA
encouraged collective bargaining over individual employee representation).
169. Id.
170. Id. at 960. The Second Circuit pointed to traditional labor practices, such as hiring
halls, that limited a union member's choice of employment and contracts that reward sen-
iority at the expense of new employees. Id. Regarding Wood's claim that he was outside
the bargaining unit, the Second Circuit stated, "the National Labor Relations Act explicitly
defines 'employee' in a way that includes workers outside the bargaining unit." Id. (quot-
ing 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1988))
171. Id. at 961.
172. Id.
173. Id. In specifically addressing the federal labor policy of freedom of contract, the
Second Circuit stated:
Freedom of contract is particularly important in the context of collective bar-
gaining between professional athletes and their leagues. Such bargaining rela-
tionships raise numerous problems with little or no precedent in standard
industrial relations. As a result, leagues and player unions may reach seemingly
unfamiliar or strange agreements. If courts were to intrude and to outlaw such
solutions, leagues and their player unions would have to arrange their affairs in a
less efficient way. It would also increase the chances of strikes by reducing the
number and quality of possible compromises.
Id.
174. Id.; see also Tagliabue, supra note 18, at 358 (expressing the notion that profes-
sional sports agreements may employ unorthodox provisions to maintain the survival of a
league). In Jewel Tea Co., the existence of a collective bargaining agreement between the
parties was the decisive element in recognizing a nonstatutory exemption to labor laws.
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Consequently, the Second Circuit refused to alter the player draft and
salary cap because doing so would have altered the entire collective bar-
gaining agreement.175
The Second Circuit's reasoning in Wood extended the antitrust analysis
beyond simply determining the existence of an arm's-length bargaining
agreement between the union and the professional sports league.' 76 In
addition to the existence of the collective bargaining agreement, the court
should examine the existence of a collective bargaining relationship be-
tween the union and the league, the role of the union as the official bar-
gaining agent of the players, and the federal labor policy of the freedom
to contract. 77 Broadening judicial examination of a challenged labor
provision to include the collective bargaining relationship between the
union and the league indicates that the agreement's provisions will not
expire automatically with the document if the relationship between the
parties continues.178
In NBA v. Williams, the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York further encouraged collective bargaining by holding
that the terms of an agreement remain effective as long as a collective
bargaining relationship between the parties exists.17 9 The court further
held that labor provisions, such as the salary cap, may not fail an antitrust
Tagliabue, supra note 18, at 358. However, the Wood decision has expanded the labor
exception to include the relationship between the parties in addition to the existence of an
agreement. Wood, 809 F.2d at 961-63. In Powell, players challenged the legality of a first
refusal/compensation system relating to free agency, which had been established through
collective bargaining. Powell v. National Football League, 930 F.2d 1293, 1303 (8th Cir.
1989). The players challenged the validity of the provisions after impasse had been
reached in negotiations between the Players Association and the NFL. Id. However, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that participants in negotiations
are protected from antitrust laws if there is an ongoing collective bargaining relationship.
Id.
175. Wood, 809 F.2d at 962.
176. See Tagliabue, supra note 18, at 358.
177. Id.
178. See id. at 359. Commissioner Tagliabue stated that:
The Second Circuit's analysis in Wood plainly suggests that the labor exemp-
tion would not expire or lapse immediately upon formal expiration of a collective
bargaining agreement. All of the federal labor statutes and policies identified by
Judge Winter-exclusive bargaining representative, freedom of contract, avoid-
ance of strikes, maximizing the solutions that can be developed in collective bar-
gaining, encouraging good faith bargaining on mandatory subjects, and other
considerations-support the conclusion that employment terms and conditions
remain exempt from antitrust challenge even after formal expiration of a collec-
tive bargaining agreement.
Id.
179. NBA v. Williams, 857 F. Supp. 1069, 1078 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
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challenge. 8 ° This ruling undermines the bargaining leverage of the
NBPA, which has utilized the threat of antitrust challenges as a bargain-
ing chip in prior negotiations. 81 Consequently, while a collective bar-
gaining relationship exists, each party must continue to engage in good
faith negotiations to reach a new agreement.1 82 If the players determine
that the labor provisions are not acceptable and cannot exclude them
through negotiation, they could end the bargaining relationship by decer-
tifying the union.1 83 The players then could test the provisions in an anti-
trust action."8  If the bargaining relationship remains unchanged,
however, the negotiated terms of the collective bargaining agreement will
govern.' 85
In In re New York Knickerbockers Basketball Club,186 the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York was
presented with disputed interpretations of the collective bargaining
agreement. In this case, the district court invalidated the use of outsized
bonus payments to sign free agent players, despite recognizing that simi-
lar provisions previously had been allowed.' 87 The district court cited po-
tentially detrimental effects on enforcing the salary cap provisions if the
bonus payments were permitted. 88 While no specific language in the col-
lective bargaining agreement invalidated outsized bonuses, the district
court found them to be contrary to the implied intent of the agree-
180. Id. at 1079 (stating that the rule of reason may protect the labor provisions if their
procompetitive effects outweigh the restrictive consequences).
181. Id. at 1071-72.
182. Id. at 1079.
183. Id. at 1078. The district court stated that the players could attempt to force the
league to abandon labor provisions by applying economic pressure, such as a strike. Id.
Alternatively, the players could decertify the union and bring an antitrust claim. Id. If the
players decertify the union, however, they would no longer be able to avail themselves of
federal labor law remedies in future disputes. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. In re New York Knickerbockers Basketball Club, 630 F. Supp. 136, 138 (S.D.N.Y.
1986) (considering whether bonus payments included in a contract offered to Albert King
circumvented the salary cap).
187. Id. at 141 (finding that even though bonus payment may have been technically
within the salary cap limitations, the bonus payments effectively voided those terms
designed to protect the interests of the parties). For a discussion of outsized bonus pay-
ments, see infra notes 217-24 and accompanying text.
188. Id. at 139.
1994] 1231
Catholic University Law Review
ment. 89 The ad hoc approach used to invalidate the bonuses ignored the
precedential value of prior rulings in free agent contract decisions."9°
The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey applied
a narrower analytic method in In re Dudley. 9 ' Unlike New York Knick-
erbockers Basketball Club, where the court interpreted general language
in the collective bargaining agreement regarding bonus payments, the
agreement in Dudley contained no language regarding the use of termi-
nation clauses.'92 The district court recognized the high probability that
Dudley would exercise his option to terminate the contract and re-sign
for a higher salary.'93 This probability was insufficient to invalidate the
contract provision, however, absent proof of an undisclosed agreement
between the parties.'94 The district court reviewed the findings in New
York Knickerbockers Basketball Club to discern the criteria for invalidat-
ing past contractual provisions that circumvented the salary cap.' 95
Based on the interpretation of the Modification Agreement in New York
Knickerbockers Basketball Club, the Dudley court held that the one-year
out provision was within the contemplation of the parties when negotiat-
ing the agreement.' 96
189. Id. at 140. Judge Carter conceded that there was no specific language in the Modi-
fication Agreement regarding the acceptable size of a bonus. Id. at 141. However, he
stated that the Modification Agreement can work only if each side respects its provisions.
Id.
190. Id. at 139. Judge Carter admitted that his decision in New York Knickerbockers
Basketball Club was a "judgement call," which did not conform to past acceptance by the
league of large bonus payments as a means of avoiding salary cap restraints. Id. Judge
Carter justified his ruling, however, by stating that it is the responsibility of both the special
masters and judges to delineate which types of contracts will be allowed, according to the
intent of the Modification Agreement. Id.
191. In re Dudley, 838 F. Supp. 172, 175 (D.N.J. 1993).
192. Id. at 177-78.
193. Id. at 182.
194. Id. at 182-83 (holding that there was insufficient evidence that Dudley intended
the termination clause to circumvent the purpose of the salary cap).
195. Id. at 178.
196. Id. at 179-82. The purpose of the Modification Agreement was to insure the finan-
cial stability of the league's teams. Id. at 181. The Agreement sought to maintain a system
of free agency that would, address the players' concerns regarding mobility, while also
maintaining control of salary levels so financially suspect teams would not be at a competi-
tive disadvantage. Id. at 181-82. The compromise required the players to agree to the
salary cap constraints in return for revenue sharing. Id. at 182. The complexity of the
agreement and the need to discourage attempts to undermine the basic goals of the agree-
ment led to the inclusion of language governing the salary cap's implementation and dis-
pute resolution techniques. Id.
Section 2(a) of Article VII, Part B of the Agreement addresses signing bonuses and
includes language permitting a player to shorten or lengthen the term of the contract. See
Agreement, supra note 3, at art. VII, pt. B, sec. 2(a), at 62-63.
[Vol. 44:205
1994] NBA Salary Cap
The court was uncomfortable, however, with the potentially detrimen-
tal effects of the one-year out provision on the salary cap.197 Allowing a
one-year out provision creates the possibility that teams and players will
circumvent the salary cap by signing below-market free agent con-
tracts.198 Forbidding unilateral termination by the players within a speci-
fied time period would mitigate the detrimental effects on the salary
cap.1 99 Despite misgivings regarding the effect of contracts such as Dud-
ley's, the district court could not find that the Special Master's findings
were clearly erroneous and, therefore, sustained Dudley's contract.2 °°
IV. THE LEGALITY OF THE SALARY CAP
A. Wood v. NBA: Challenging the Salary Cap
In 1984, Leon Wood became the first player to challenge the legality of
the NBA's salary cap, by initiating a suit alleging that the player draft and
the salary cap violated section 1 of the Sherman Act. 20 ' After being
drafted in the first round of the college draft by the Philadelphia 76ers,
Wood was offered a one-year contract at the league's minimum salary of
197. Dudley, 838 F. Supp. at 182. Judge Debevoise indicated that he felt the Special
Master may have minimized the potentially harmful effects of the one-year out provision.
Id. The potential effects of the one-year out provision, however, cannot be forecasted. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 183. Judge Debevoise stated that lines must be drawn that would enable
easier determination of the intent of the parties. Id. The express terms of the agreement,
however, do not provide an adequate basis for invalidating the one-year out provision. Id.
200. Id. at 184. In the two leading cases involving the implementation and interpreta-
tion of the salary cap provision, New York Knickerbockers Basketball Club and Dudley,
both courts have utilized an ad hoc approach to dispute resolution. In New York Knicker-
bockers Basketball Club, the district court found that the Knicks attempted to circumvent
the salary cap by using bonus payments to fit the total amount of compensation paid to
King under the salary cap constraints. In re New York Knickerbockers Basketball Club,
630 F. Supp. 136, 137 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). The Special Master allowed the King contract to
stand because he recognized that the league had permitted other contracts with outsized
bonus payments. Id. However, in this case, the district court adopted the NBA's position
that such contracts were a dangerous threat to the survival of the salary cap. Id. There-
fore, King's contract was invalidated. Id.
In Dudley, the court cited the New York Knickerbockers Basketball Club reasoning re-
garding the potentially detrimental effects of the one-year out provision on the salary cap.
Dudley, 838 F. Supp. at 179. The district court warned that such contracts might under-
mine the intent of the salary cap. Id. at 181. However, the district court reviewed the
Special Master's acceptance of the one-year out provision rather than making an express
ruling on the contract provision. Id. at 183. The district court may have realized that it
would be difficult to rule that a player may not sign a contract for less money than another
team had offered and still justify the salary cap as promoting the financial stability of the
league. See id. at 181.
201. Wood v. NBA, 602 F. Supp. 525, 526 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), aff'd, 809 F.2d 954 (2d Cir.
1987).
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$75,000 because the team was under salary cap constraints.2 °2 In re-
sponse, Wood challenged the salary cap, alleging that the salary cap re-
strictions required him to accept a contract worth less than his fair market
value or to miss a year of professional basketball.
203
Finding that the three-pronged Mackey test 2t1 had been satisfied, the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York de-
nied Wood's claim that the player draft and the salary cap violated anti-
trust laws.205 First, the collective bargaining agreement only affected the
parties involved in the negotiations.2" Second, the subjects of the agree-
ment were proper subjects of collective bargaining. 20 7 Third, the agree-
ment resulted from bona fide, arm's-length collective bargaining.208
In affirming the district court's decision, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit stressed that the draft and the salary cap
were products of an agreement between an employer and an employee,
not among horizontal competitors.20 9 Consequently, the district court
should have examined these agreements under federal labor legislation,
despite the unique nature of professional sports in which teams support
202. Id. Wood had enjoyed a successful college basketball career and was a member of
the 1984 United States Olympic Basketball Team, which won the gold medal. Id. His
success at these levels led to his selection in the first round of the NBA draft. Id. Histori-
cally, there has been a correlation between a player's ability and prospects for success in
the NBA and the round in which the player is selected in the college draft. Id. According
to Patrick Williams, Vice President and General Manager of the Philadelphia 76ers, the
team offered Wood the minimum salary to maintain the team's exclusive negotiating rights
with him while they tried to maneuver around the salary cap restrictions. Id. at 526-27.
203. Id. at 527.
204. See supra note 160 (discussing the Mackey test).
205. Wood, 602 F. Supp. at 528. Judge Carter stated:
Both provisions affect only the parties to the collective bargaining agreement-
the NBA and the players-involve mandatory subjects of bargaining as defined
by federal labor laws, and are the result of bona fide arms-length negotiations.
Both are proper subjects of concern by the Players Association. As such these
provisions come under the protective shield of our national labor policy and are
exempt from the reach of the Sherman Act.
Id. at 528. The Second Circuit adopted this reasoning and affirmed the district court's
denial of Wood's cause of action. Wood, 809 F.2d at 962-63. The Second Circuit stated
that Wood's claim for damages was based on a claim for lost wages. Id. at 962. The con-
troversial nature of the conditions of employment in professional sports, however, are pre-
cisely why such issues are the subjects of collective bargaining. Id
206. Wood, 602 F. Supp. at 528.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Wood, 809 F.2d at 959 (suggesting that such an agreement between NBA teams
would be illegal if they were horizontal competitors).
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each other's economic growth. 10 Courts continued to preserve the valid-
ity of the salary cap in two subsequent cases challenging its legitimacy.
B. The Salary Cap and Free Agency: In re New York Knickerbockers
Basketball Club
In 1985, the New York Knickerbockers (Knicks) attempted to sign Al-
bert King to replace Leonard Robinson, a veteran forward who did not
renew his contract for the 1984-85 season.211 The Knicks and the NBA
disagreed over the correct interpretation of an exception to the salary cap
regarding free agent signings.212 The Knicks had exceeded the maximum
team salary limitation for the 1984-85 season and therefore had to com-
ply with an exception stated in Article III.C(2)(a)-(g) of the Modification
Agreement.213 Specifically, Article III.C(2)(c)(i) requires that a team ex-
ceeding the salary limitation could replace a retired player at fifty percent
of the salary paid to the retired player.214 Article III.C(2)(e), however,
allows a team to replace a veteran free agent who left the team at 100%
of his last salary.215 Thus, the disagreement between the league and the
Knicks required a judicial determination of the status of Leonard
Robinson.216
The Knicks contended that Robinson was an unsigned veteran free
agent, and consequently, they offered Albert King a contract worth 100%
of Robinson's last salary.217 The NBA claimed that Robinson retired,
thus allowing the Knicks to spend only fifty percent of Robinson's last
210. Id. The Second Circuit recognized that the "[t]he nature of professional sports as
a business and professional sports teams as employers calls for contractual arrangements
suited to that unusual commercial context." Id.
211. In re New York Knickerbockers Basketball Club, 630 F. Supp. 136, 137-38
(S.D.N.Y. 1986); see Newton, supra note 2, at 1002.
212. New York Knickerbockers Basketball Club, 630 F. Supp. at 138.
213. Id. The Modification Agreement amended the 1980 collective bargaining agree-
ment to include the salary cap provisions negotiated in 1983. Id. The NBA and the NBPA
negotiated this Agreement, which the district court in New York approved in 1983, and
included the salary cap provisions. Id. at 136-37.
214. Id. at 137-38.
215. Id. at 138.
216. Id. at 137-38. By the terms of the Agreement, an impartial basketball expert des-
ignated by the parties would make such a determination. Id. at 138.
217. Id. at 138. Based on the Knicks' assumption that the salary cap permitted them to
offer King 100% of Robinson's last salary, the Knicks originally offered King a contract
that included a $400,000 signing bonus and guaranteed salaries for five years in the follow-
ing amounts: $450,000 in 1985-86; $450,000 in 1986-87; $600,000 in 1987-88; $700,000 in
1988-89; $700,000 in 1989-90. Id. Article III.C(7) of the Modification Agreement stipu-
lates tihat signing bonuses are to be prorated over any seasons in which salary was guaran-
teed. Id. Therefore, the Knicks initial offer to King was below the $540,000 salary paid to
Robinson in his last season by offering King $530,000, which included the prorated bonus
payment for the first two seasons. Id. The Knicks contended that the contract only needed
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salary on a replacement player.218 According to the guidelines of the
Modification Agreement, the dispute was submitted to an independent
expert who concurred with the league's interpretation.21 9
In response to the ruling, the Knicks made a second offer to King.22°
The second offer contained a large bonus in the first year that augmented
relatively low salary figures throughout the contract.221 Under the collec-
tive bargaining agreement, signing bonuses are prorated over the life of
the contract, thus resulting in an annual amount paid to King below fifty
percent of Robinson's last salary.222 In response, the NBA challenged
this offer as an attempt to circumvent the salary cap.223 In November
1985, a Special Master ruled in favor of the Knicks, noting prior acquies-
cence by the NBA to the use of outsized bonuses to achieve formal com-
pliance with the salary cap.224
to comply with the salary cap for the first two seasons because the collective bargaining
agreement was due to expire at the conclusion of the 1986-87 basketball season. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id. The district court explained that Article III.C(2)(e)(ii) and Article IV.A(3) of
the Modification Agreement state that disagreements between the league and the NBPA
regarding the proper applications of exceptions to the salary cap will be decided by an
" 'Impartial Basketball Expert' " chosen by the partes. Id. In this case, the parties chose
William Cunningham, a former NBA player. Id.
220. Id. This second offer conformed to the requirements of the salary cap for a player
signed to replace a retiree. Id.
221. Id. The Knicks' offer to King contained a signing bonus of $960,000. Id. The
salary figures for five seasons were: $75,000 in 1985-86; $75,000 in 1986-87; $700,000 in
1987-88; $700,000 in 1988-89; $800,000 in 1989-90. Because the $960,000 bonus was pro
rated over five years, the first two years of the contract would have paid King $267,000 per
year. Id. This was below the allowable amount according to the terms of the Modification
Agreement, which enabled the Knicks to replace Robinson's salary with a player earning
$270,000. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id. Article III.C(9) prohibits devices designed to circumvent the salary cap. Id. at
139. In accordance with the provisions governing dispute resolution in the collective bar-
gaining agreement, a Special Master is appointed to hear labor disputes. Id.
224. Id. In 1984, the Knicks attempted to sign Jim Paxson to replace Ray Williams, a
veteran free agent who left the team. Newton, supra note 2, at 1008. The Knicks offered
Paxson, a veteran free agent from the Portland Trail Blazers, a six-year contract. Id. Ac-
cording to the terms of the Modification Agreement, the Knicks had $500,000 to spend on
a replacement player. Id. Consequently, the Knicks structured a contract for Paxson in-
cluding total salary payments of $3.5 million, a $3.5 million loan, and a $2.5 million signing
bonus. Newton, supra note 2, at 1008-09. The term of the loan called for $1.75 million to
be repaid after three years and the remaining $1.75 million to be repaid after five years.
Id. at 1009 n.55. Paxson's total remuneration in the first year of the contract was $495,000,
which was comprised of $75,000 salary and $420,000 from the pro rated signing bonus. Id.
at 1009 n.56.
The NBA claimed that the structure of the contract circumvented the salary cap. Id. at
1009. An arbitrator, however, ruled that the large signing bonus was acceptable because it
was within the plain language of the Modification Agreement. Id.
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The District Court for the Southern District of New York, in In re New
York Knickerbockers Basketball Club, reversed the Special Master's rul-
ing as undermining the intent of the salary cap.225 The district court lim-
ited the scope of its ruling to the present case by requiring a case-by-case
evaluation of player contracts. 226 In evaluating the salary cap provision,
the district court observed that both the league and the players made
concessions in negotiations.227 For instance, the NBA received a maxi-
mum aggregate salary, while the NBPA received a minimum aggregate
salary limitation per team.228 Therefore, the court deemed negotiated
terms as well as their implied intent to be worthy of protection.229
C. Contract Provisions Favoring Players in Free Agency
On October 27, 1993, the United States District Court for the District
of New Jersey narrowly construed the salary cap language in a suit chal-
lenging the validity of the contract Chris Dudley signed with the Portland
Trail Blazers.23° The NBA objected to a one-year out provision that al-
Another device utilized to sign players to larger contracts that the league has allowed,
despite salary cap constraints, has been " 'backloading.' " Id. at 1010. Backloading pro-
vides for escalated salary payments in years after the Modification Agreement expires. Id.
at 1010 n.67. One example is the contract signed by Patrick Ewing with the Knicks that
paid him salaries of $750,000 in 1985-86; $1,000,000 in 1986-87; $2,250,000 in 1987-88;
$2,750,000 in 1988-89; $3,500,000 in 1989-90; and $3,750,000 in 1990-91. Id. at 1011 n.72.
The contract also called for Ewing to receive a $5,000,000 interest-free loan. Id. The NBA
approved the contract. Id.
225. New York Knickerbockers Basketball Club, 630 F. Supp. at 139. Judge Carter
stated that if the court affirmed the Special Master's ruling permitting the King contract,
the salary cap would be destroyed for the remaining years of the Modification Agreement.
Id. Judge Carter further stated that he did not feel constrained by prior contracts that
allowed the use of outsized bonuses because his task in this case was to determine if the
contract offered to Albert King nullified the Modification Agreement. Id. By limiting the
scope of his examination to the present circumstance, Judge Carter effectively freed him-
self from the constraints of precedent. Id.
226. Id. In dicta, Judge Carter offered the following approach as a means of evaluating
terms of a contract that would be acceptable under the Modification Agreement:
A rough guide for the Special Master is to determine whether an offer sheet
comes within the requisite salary cap for each of the guaranteed years. If it does,
it is in keeping with the agreement. If it does not, it circumvents the agreement
unless the party claiming compliance presents justifying reason and circumstance
to warrant a contrary conclusion.
Id. at 141.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 139. The players were willing to agree to the salary cap limitations to receive
the revenue-sharing provisions. Id. Therefore, they should not be allowed to structure
contracts that formally comply with the Modification Agreement if the effect is to under-
mine the Agreement's provisions. Id. at 141.
229. Id. at 140.
230. In re Dudley, 838 F. Supp. 172, 184 (D.N.J. 1993) (holding that the one-year out
provision in Dudley's contract did not violate the salary cap).
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231lowed Dudley to terminate the contract unilaterally after one year.
The league contended that Dudley intentionally circumvented the salary
cap when he signed a contract that paid him a salary below his fair mar-
ket value.232 The NBA further contended that the parties implicitly
agreed that Dudley would exercise the out clause after one year, thus
permitting the parties to negotiate a new contract reflecting Dudley's
market value determined by competitive bids for his services.23
3
The NBA filed its objections to the contract with a Special Master for a
ruling on the validity of one-year out provisions.234 The Special Master
found that the one-year out provision did not undermine the salary cap or
threaten financial stability within the league.235 A free agent player may
accept a lower salary to retain the freedom to choose the team that best
suits his contractual requirements without necessarily circumventing the
salary cap.236 If Dudley had signed only a one-year contract, both he and
the team would be in exactly the same position as if he exercised the one-
year out provision.237 Furthermore, the Special Master noted that the
league had not objected to multiyear contracts signed by other players
that provided for opt-out opportunities after the second year of the con-
231. Id. at 174. Dudley was a veteran player who previously played for the New Jersey
Nets. Id. On August 3, 1993, Dudley signed a seven-year, fully-guaranteed contract to
play for the Portland Trail Blazers. Id. at 175-76.
232. Id. at 181. Dudley's agent, Dan Fegan, contended that considerations other than
salary factored into the player's decision regarding which team to join. Id. at 175. Among
these considerations were the player's desire to play for a team with a proven ability to
compete for the league championship and the player's familiarity with the West Coast. Id.
Express provisions in the salary cap, however, prohibit a player from signing a contract for
an amount below his market value if his intent is to circumvent the salary cap. Id. at 177.
233. Id.
234. Id. While the case involving Dudley's contract became the focus of the Special
Master's report and was heard by the district court the one-year out provision had been
included in two other contracts signed by free agent players: Craig Ehlo with the Atlanta
Hawks and Toni Kukoc with the Chicago Bulls. Id. at 175-76.
235. Id. at 177-78. The purpose of the salary cap was to create competitive parity
throughout the league by limiting the amount of money that each team could spend on
player salaries. Id. at 176; see supra note 4 (discussing the salary cap in more detail).
Therefore, teams in larger markets would not have an unfair advantage over teams playing
in smaller markets. Dudley, 838 F. Supp. at 176. No evidence, however, currently exists to
confirm or refute the notion that allowing contracts with one-yeai out provisions necessar-
ily will result in the escalation of salaries. Id. at 183.
236. Id. The Special Master distinguished the holding in the New York Knickerbockers
Basketball Club by reasoning that the second offer to King merely relabeled the payments
to King. Id. at 178. The Dudley offer, on the other hand, was a new transaction. Id.
According to the contract that Dudley signed with the Portland Trail Blazers, he may or
may not wind up with more money than he would have received from the New Jersey offer.
Id.
237. Id.
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tracts.238 Absent any evidence of a secret agreement between the parties,
the Special Master upheld the validity of the one-year out provision and
denied the NBA's claim.239
In a final attempt to have one-year out provisions invalidated, the
league brought suit against Dudley in the New Jersey district court. 240 In
considering the league's claims, the district court required a finding that
the Special Master's ruling was clearly erroneous to overrule the find-
241ings. Consequently, the district court upheld the Special Master's rul-
ings despite concern that the one-year out provisions ultimately might
have a detrimental effect on the salary cap.242
V. DUDLEY HAS EXPOSED A WEAKNESS IN THE SALARY CAP THAT
CAN BE REMEDIED ONLY THROUGH COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING
One-year out provisions pose an obvious threat to the salary cap's ef-
fectiveness in controlling the league's labor costs. 243 In effect, the provi-
sion provides a player with the opportunity to negotiate a salary without
salary cap constraints within a relatively short period after joining a
team.2"4 This provision weakens the NBA's salary cap objective signifi-
cantly.245 Because the collective bargaining agreement does not address
238. Id. The Special Master noted that the logic behind a one-year out provision in-
cluded in a multiyear contract does not necessarily demonstrate an intent to circumvent
the salary cap. Id. Because the league had allowed contractual clauses enabling players to
terminate contracts in the later years of multiyear contracts, it would seem inequitable to
invalidate one-year out provisions without a more definite showing of intent to circumvent
the salary cap. Id.
239. Id. at 180.
240. Id. The league also sued the Bridgeman class plaintiffs because they nominally
represented Dudley, through the NBPA, in the defense of a player's right to include a one-
year out provision in his contract. Id. at 174.
241. Id. at 180. The district court cited the Bridgeman Settlement Agreement, which
incorporates Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 53(a), (c), (d), and (e). Id. The settlement
agreement specifically provided that "the Court shall accept the Special Master's findings
of fact unless clearly erroneous and the Special Master's recommendations of relief unless
based upon clearly erroneous findings of fact, incorrect application of the law or abuse of
discretion." Id.
242. Id. at 180-83. The district court held that a one-year out provision in multiyear
contracts had been within the contemplation of the parties during the negotiation of the
Bridgeman Settlement Agreement. Id. at 183. Therefore, the findings of the Special
Master must be upheld despite the potential consequences the provisions will have on the
implementation of the salary cap. Id.
243. Id. at 182 (holding that one-year out provisions negatively affect the salary cap).
244. Id. at 183.
245. Id. An example of the effect of the provisions allowing teams to re-sign their own
free agents without being constrained by the salary cap is the Los Angeles Lakers, who will
pay $42 million in salary for the 1993-94 season, while the salary cap for the season is $15.9
1994]
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the one-year out provision, there is little ground for courts to invalidate
contracts without proof of an intention to circumvent the cap.246 Recog-
nizing the national labor policy of encouraging settlement of disputes
through collective bargaining, courts cannot strike down the one-year out
provision without relying on some basis in the negotiated agreement.247
Consequently, the NBA must determine what consideration is valuable
enough to the players to persuade them to surrender their rights to con-
tracts with out clauses.
When the NBPA agreed to the league's demand for a salary cap in
1983, the league was suffering through a difficult period financially.248
More than half of the league's teams lost money in the 1980-81 season
and attendance at games was poor.249 The NBA proposed the salary cap
as a means of stabilizing the finances of the teams and enhancing compet-
itive parity throughout the league.250 The league contended that setting a
maximum aggregate salary amount for each team would slow the trend of
rising player salaries.251 The league intended the creation of the mini-
mum and maximum aggregate salary amount to foster a sense of partner-
ship between the league and the players because increased revenues were
in both parties' best interests.252
A major concern of the league prior to the implementation of the sal-
ary cap was that free agency would induce star players to play for teams
in larger media markets, where greater financial resources were available
to sign these players.253 The league was concerned that teams in the
larger markets would dominate the teams in smaller markets, which could
not compete for the free agent talent.254
In the ten years since the NBA included the salary cap in the collective
bargaining agreement, the financial performance of the NBA has im-
proved substantially.255 Some commentators believe that this financial
million. Richard Justice, Sports World Labors to Get Back in Game, WASH. POSr, Oct. 1,
1994, at BI, B5.
246. See Dudley, 838 F. Supp. at 180.
247. Id.
248. See id. at 181 (stating that financially weaker teams are at a competitive disadvan-
tage to financially stronger teams in attracting talented players).
249. Swift, supra note 4, at 77 (stating that 16 out of 23 teams were losing money and
that fan attendance was decreasing).
250. In re New York Knicks Basketball Club, 630 F. Supp. 136, 136-37 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
251. Id. at 137.
252. Dudley, 838 F. Supp. at 181.
253. Id.
254. New York Knickerbockers Basketball Club, 630 F. Supp. at 136-37.
255. Bart Hubbuch, Adams Eyes End to NBA's Cap, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 26, 1993, at
D1, D8.
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improvement directly relates to the implementation of the salary cap. 256
While the salary cap has stabilized the trend of higher salaries, other fac-
tors have contributed to the league's financial strength including the ad-
vent of star players who have increased the league's visibility and greater
television revenues. 25
7
In response to the heightened demand for league-related products, the
NBA created NBA Properties, Inc.E58 This subsidiary maintains the right
to market the images of the players on novelty items and to sell parapher-
nalia bearing team logos worldwide.2 59 According to one estimate, NBA
Properties generated $1 billion in revenues in 1991.260 This revenue fig-
ure is expected to increase substantially in the future as NBA Properties
begins to exploit the league's growing popularity in international
markets. 2
6 1
According to the definition of "Defined Gross Revenues" in the collec-
tive bargaining agreement, the revenues generated by NBA Properties
are not included in salary cap calculations. 62 The exclusion of this in-
come lowers the maximum aggregate salary for each team. Public state-
ments by players and the NBPA indicate that this income will be a point
of negotiation if the current salary cap is to be included in future collec-
tive bargaining agreements.263
If the league determines that labor costs must be constrained but is
unable to negotiate a salary cap for veteran players, it may try to imple-
ment a cap on rookie salaries. 264 Such a provision would allow teams to
avoid committing to large contracts for unproven talent.2 65 A rookie cap
probably would be challenged by players entering the league. Courts,
however, have previously held that the NBPA is authorized to negotiate
labor provisions affecting prospective players. 66
Based upon the players' agreement to the original salary cap, it is evi-
dent that the players recognize the important correlation between the
256. Id.
257. Swift, supra note 4, at 86-88.
258. Agreement, supra note 3, at art. XXXII, sec. 1, at 125.
259. Id.
260. Swift, supra note 4, at 82; see also Justice, supra note 245, at 1, B5 (stating that
the owners expect to make approximately $300 million from the sale of licensed apparel in
the 1993-94 season and that the players want to share this profit).
261. Swift, supra note 4, at 82.
262. Agreement, supra note 3, at art. VII, pt. A, sec. 1(a)(1), at 55-56.
263. Hubbuch, supra note 255, at D8.
264. Harvey Araton, Penny for Your Thoughts, Billions of Them, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14,
1994, at B14.
265. Id.
266. See infra notes 217-29 and accompanying text.
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league's and their financial viability.267 The players were willing to limit
the aggregate salary amount available in return for a minimum salary
amount.268 In upcoming negotiations for a new collective bargaining
agreement, the players may agree to maintain a salary cap if they are
adequately compensated. 269 Adequate compensation probably will in-
clude a portion of the income generated by NBA Properties. 270 There-
fore, whether the salary cap is included in the next collective bargaining
agreement most likely will be decided on basic contract principles, rather
than on any element of antitrust or labor relations.271
VI. CONCLUSION
The NBA included the salary cap included in the collective bargaining
agreement as a means of controlling labor costs in the NBA. The arm's-
length negotiations between the NBA and the NBPA satisfied courts that
the collective bargaining agreement, in general, qualifies for a nonstatu-
tory exemption from antitrust laws. Thus, courts have applied the exemp-
tion to specific provisions of the collective bargaining agreement. In re
Dudley demonstrates, however, that the courts are likely to construe the
written terms of the agreement narrowly. If the NBA deems it necessary
to include the salary cap in future collective bargaining agreements, the
provision's effectiveness will be based on the league's ability to negotiate
the elimination of one-year out provisions. In the current judicial envi-
ronment, courts are unlikely to intervene in the collective bargaining rela-
tionship between the NBA and the NBPA or to interpret the express
terms of the agreement in a broad manner.
Jonathan C. Latimer
267. See infra notes 217-29 and accompanying text.
268. Araton, supra note 264, at B14 (stating that the aggregate cap dollar limitation
rose each season and players received unrestricted free agency after a specific length of
time in the league).
269. Id.
270. See id.
271. See id.
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